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This dissertation consists of three essays on regulation. In the first essay, 
“Firm Reputation and Screening at the Patent Office”, we assert that the patent office 
is an important regulator, exerting influence on firm outcomes. Prior research 
argues that powerful groups such as top innovators are able to capture their 
regulators , gaining favorable treatment in return for either monetary 
contributions to legislators’ political committees or hoped-for future employment 
of regulators in the firms they regulate or in the firms of their legal 
representatives. It is also argued that regulators face many audiences and 
attempt to maximize their legitimacy to political entities, legal entities, the 
general public and the firms affected by their regulation. This can introduce a 
lack of consistency in decision-making. Given the considerable power of many 
regulators, this has implications for both policy and firm strategy. 
 The patent office, in particular, faces considerable uncertainty about the 
value of the patent rights it provides. Further, patent examiners are under 
pressure to grant patents quickly and have no way of permanently disposing of 
an application other than by granting it. We argue that patent examiners tend to 
   
   
 
 
look for certain signals in attempting to determine the quality of the application. 
We assert that the patent office’s focus on helping its clients obtain intellectual 
property rights make their clients’ prior reputations most salient. Therefore 
examiners tend to rely on the prominence of the applicant in the prior patent art.  
This can grant either a positive or negative reputation depending upon the 
general reputation of that field in prior patent art. 
We utilize a dataset of all patents granted from 2001-2003. We use 
examiner-added citations to prior patent art, controlling for applicant-added 
citations as a measure of examiner screening. We find that firm reputation for 
patenting influences the level of scrutiny to which a patent application is 
subjected. In the conclusion we discuss the implications of these findings.  
In the second essay, “Which drugs obtain the Pediatric Exclusivity Provision” 
we examine the pediatric exclusivity regulation provision. Pediatric exclusivity is 
designed to reward companies for conducting pediatric trials for dosage and 
safety with 6 months’ extra monopoly on their drug. Using data from the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys from 1996-2007 and drug data from the FDA, 
we find that companies appear to base the decision to conduct pediatric trials 
almost solely on the basis of current sales (and hence presumably future 
projected revenue). We find the threshold for a sharply increased probability of 
obtaining pediatric exclusivity is annual sales of $260 million in the prior year. 
   
   
 
 
We estimate, very conservatively, that the total liability to consumers is US$ 21 
billion as of end 2007.  
We also find, in accordance with prior criticism, that, (barring ADHD 
drugs, which are marketed primarily to minors) even after controlling for the 
total sales, the proportion of sales to minors does not affect the probability of 
obtaining pediatric exclusivity. This is in concordance with regulatory capture 
theory which would suggest that a powerful group (i.e.. brand-name drug 
manufacturers ) influenced Congress to pass this legislation to procure a benefit 
for themselves with a not-easily perceived cost to the much more diffuse group 
of pharmaceutical customers who pay brand-name prices for 6 more months as a 
result of delayed generic entry. 
In the third essay “Pediatric Exclusivity - Are the intended benefits being 
realized?” we examine the underlying rationale for the pediatric exclusivity and 
test whether the intended benefits of pediatric exclusivity are being realized.  The 
pediatric exclusivity rule is intended to provide benefits to pediatric patients by 
providing clinicians with label information regarding safety and dosage in 
pediatric populations. We test whether valuable and important information is 
being produced and disseminated by the clinical trials that are undertaken to 
gain pediatric exclusivity. We do this by examining the patterns of publication of 
clinical trials before and after pediatric exclusivity is obtained and by examining 
   
   
 
 
the patterns of prescriptions to minor patients before and after pediatric 
exclusivity is obtained.  
We find no evidence of greater dissemination of pediatric information in 
the peer-reviewed literature after obtaining pediatric exclusivity. We also find no 
evidence of changing patterns of prescriptions to minor patients after pediatric 
exclusivity is obtained. This leads us to question the value of the information 
being provided and conclude that the intended benefits of pediatric exclusivity 
provision are not being realized. We conclude that pediatric exclusivity 
legislation is an example of regulatory capture, designed primarily to increase 
monopoly protection of the sales of brand-name drugs without producing many 
tangible benefits.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Regulators are some of the most powerful institutions in the market. They 
have the powers to set the “rules of the game” for the market and allocate 
punishment for the infraction of those rules. The effectiveness of any institution 
depends upon the cost of ascertaining violations of formal and informal rules 
and the severity of the punishment (North 1990).  The primary mechanism for 
regulatory control is coercive (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), but also uses it’s own 
legitimacy (Weber 1947) , inducements and authority, i.e. coercive power within 
a legitimate framework of norms (Scott 1995) to impose its rules on industry. 
Regulators can have the power to significantly affect businesses cash flow, 
determining firm entry, product entry, prices1, competitive entry, fines, etc. As 
such they have been studied in great detail by economists, sociologists and 
political scientists.  
                                                 
1
 As Alfred Kahn, head of the now defunct Civil Aviation Board (CAB) once observed of 
the decisions he had to make as head of the CAB: “May an air taxi acquire a fifty-seat 
plane? May a supplemental carrier carry horses from Florida to somewhere in the 
Northeast? Should we let a scheduled carrier pick up stranded charter customers and 
carry them on seats that would otherwise be empty, at charter rates? … May a carrier 
introduce a special fare for skiers but refund the cost of their ticket if there is no snow? 
May the employees of two financially affiliated airlines wear similar-looking uniforms? 
-Is it any wonder that I ask myself every day: Is this action necessary? Is this what my 
mother raised me to do?” - Greenspan, A. (2007). The Age of Turbulence- Adventures in 
a New World. New York, The Penguin Press. 
  






Pigou’s (1938)  theory of public interest regulation holds that markets 
exhibit failures such as externalities and monopoly power. Regulation is 
therefore used by governments to serve the general interest of society and 
maximize social welfare (McCraw 1975)  In this view, the institutions that 
regulate the market are viewed as Bayesian statisticians, optimizing welfare, 
frequently under incomplete information conditions. (Laffont and Tirole 1986). 
Carpenter (2010) argues that there has not been much development of this as a 
theory, and that it lacks an account of how regulatory politics might produce the 
policies it describes. He criticizes the use of the term “public interest” regulation 
as being less a theory than a description of previous views of regulation by critics 
and asserts that these critics use “public interest” purely as a straw man to 
contrast with theories such as regulatory capture theory (Stigler 1971).  
 
Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action where incentives to organize are 
higher for small groups with high stakes that are spread among fewer actors, 
was used by Stigler (1971) to develop the idea that an industry with few 
producers would be able to influence actors more than widely disbursed 
consumer groups. Peltzman (1976) accounted for the fact that the United States 
Congress occasionally passes laws that hurt large businesses and reduce 
protectionism by developing a model that balanced interest group support and 






voter group support to legislators. This still did not account for the role of 
regulatory agencies in administering and enforcing rules and regulations. Laffont 
and Tirole (1991) developed an agency-theoretic model and argued that interest 
groups are more powerful when they seek to obtain inefficient regulation, where 
inefficiency is determined by the degree of information asymmetry between the 
regulated industry and the regulators. 
 
Industry has many ways of influencing regulators. Peltzman (1976) 
argued that industry primarily influences legislators in Congress by providing 
financial support (e.g. donations to Political Action Committees) to legislators,  
who require both votes and money to win elections. The legislators balance the 
financial incentives provided by industry groups with the voting incentives 
provided by large groups of diffuse individuals such as consumer groups to 
generate optimal legislation (from their point of view). Interest groups may also 
directly affect the regulatory agencies by providing bribes2, though this is likely 
to be more common in countries where the rule of law is relatively weak and 
corruption is more accepted than the US (Dal Bo and Di Tella 2003). The view 
that regulations are put in primarily for the benefit of politicians and bureaucrats 
                                                 
2
 (2010). Dynamic but dirty: A series of corruption scandals shake Indian businesses The Economist. 






to collect these bribes and other incentives is sometimes referred to as the 
tollbooth view (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Dal Bó 2006)  of regulation.   
 
In countries with more stringent rules against outright bribery, the 
revolving-door phenomenon contributes strongly to regulators being more 
pliable to industry demands. The revolving door refers to the twin facts of 
regulators often having held prior jobs in the industry they are regulating, and 
the hoped-for subsequent employment of public officials with the regulated 
firms or their law-firms or public-interest law firms (Laffont and Tirole 1993; 
Djankov, La Porta et al. 2002).   
 
Regardless of the methods used, most models of regulatory capture 
predict a balance of power in favor of industrial groups that can organize more 
easily than diffuse groups or consumers (Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983). Laws and 
rules are not always in favor of the most powerful groups, but the 
preponderance is likely to be in the direction favored by powerful incumbents 
and groups. The power of the regulator depends upon its technical ability to 
extract information about the firm and the true value of regulation to the firm, 
thus reducing information asymmetry.  
 






Carpenter (2010) , in his study on the FDA, criticizes both regulatory 
capture and public interest theories as categorizing officials as either “automaton 
or kleptocrat” (Carpenter 2010, page 43) and argues that it is the image and 
reputation of the regulatory organization that is the predictor of its power and 
influence with legislators and the regulated industry. He argues that these public 
beliefs about the organizations fairness, competence, etc. influence legislators to 
grant powers to the institution and influence industry’s acceptance of 
institutional rules and regulations. In this construct, the agency attempts to 
maximize its own legitimacy thus ensuring its own increased bureaucratic 
power, freedom of action and survival (Kim 2007; Carpenter 2010).  
 
In the chapters that follow we will look at the effects of the actions of the 
US Patent Office and its impact on innovators, and the costs and benefits of 
legislation passed by US Congress affecting the pharmaceutical industry and 
administered by the FDA. The first deals with only the actions of the regulator 
and the industry, with legislative action taking a background. The second deals 
primarily with legislative action and the consequences of pediatric exclusivity 
legislation. Nevertheless, this legislation is administered by the FDA. 
 






Public interest theory (Pigou 1938) would demand that the actions of the 
regulator be to maximize social welfare. Evidence that the regulator is likely to 
favor one group over another (producers vs. consumers, powerful industry 
groups versus less powerful industry groups), especially if that group is smaller 
in number, more powerful and better organized would favor a regulatory 
capture view (Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983; Laffont and Tirole 1991; Laffont and 
Tirole 1993; Dal Bó 2006).  If maintaining legitimacy and reputation of the 
regulator are its primary goal (Kim 2007; Carpenter 2010), then we would 
anticipate that the optimal action of the regulator would be to enhance its 
reputation in the eyes of audiences that are more salient to it.  Nevertheless the 
organization would be less likely to take actions that may damage any 
bureaucratic legitimacy it possesses. However, actions that have subtle effects in 
the direction of salient audiences (i.e. powerful industry groups), without strong 
repercussions from other audiences (i.e. consumers, less powerful industry 
groups, potential entrants) would be expected.  
 
In our analyses in the following three chapters we test whether the actions 
of the regulator affect the players in a market in a manner that is socially optimal. 
We anticipate finding evidence of regulatory capture and the influence of 
powerful groups such as top innovators and marketers of brand-name drugs. We 






do not expect that our analyses will conclusively be able to determine whether 
the primary goal of the regulator is bureaucratic stability or whether regulatory 
capture has induced the regulator to favor a powerful group in either case. 
However, in the chapters dealing with the effects of congressional legislation on 
pediatric exclusivity, we do not anticipate regulatory action to ensure 
bureaucratic survival to be a strong factor, since almost all the specifics were 
written into the legislation passed by the US Congress rather than set by FDA 
directives.  






Chapter 2: Firm Reputation and Screening at the Patent Office 
 
Abstract 
The patent office is an important regulator, exerting influence on firm outcomes. 
Prior research argues that powerful groups such as top innovators are able to 
capture their regulators , gaining favorable treatment in return for either 
monetary contributions to legislators’ political committees or hoped-for future 
employment of regulators in the firms they regulate or in the firms of their legal 
representatives. It is also argued that regulators face many audiences and 
attempt to maximize their legitimacy to political entities, legal entities, the 
general public and the firms affected by their regulation. This can introduce a 
lack of consistency in decision-making. Given the considerable power of many 
regulators, this has implications for both policy and firm strategy. 
 The patent office, in particular, faces considerable uncertainty about the 
value of the patent rights it provides. Further, patent examiners are under 
pressure to grant patents quickly and have no way of permanently disposing of 
an application other than by granting it. We argue that patent examiners tend to 
look for certain signals in attempting to determine the quality of the application. 
We assert that the patent office’s focus on helping its clients obtain intellectual 
property rights make their clients’ prior reputations most salient. Therefore 






examiners tend to rely on the prominence of the applicant in the prior patent art.  
This can grant either a positive or negative reputation depending upon the 
general reputation of that field in prior patent art. 
We utilize a dataset of all patents granted from 2001-2003. We use 
examiner-added citations to prior patent art, controlling for applicant-added 
citations as a measure of examiner screening. We find that firm reputation for 
patenting influences the level of scrutiny to which a patent application is 
subjected. In the conclusion we discuss the implications of these findings.  






Firm Reputation and Screening at the Patent Office 
 
 
Theories of Regulation 
The patent office is an important regulator, responsible for granting 
twenty-year monopolies on new inventions. The decision to award — or not 
award — patents has significant effects on firms’ revenue streams and decisions 
to enter product markets (Levin, Klevorick et al. 1987; Cohen, Nelson et al. 2000). 
The objective of this limited-time monopoly reward for invention is to benefit 
society by rewarding innovation, research and development.  
 
The role of the patent office, as a regulator, is to maximize social 
welfare(Pigou 1938). To do so, economic welfare theory posits that it is supposed 
to behave as a Bayesian statistician, balancing societal costs and benefits on 
observable parameters when deciding whether to award patents (Laffont and 
Tirole 1993).  It is however, not necessarily the case that the patent office (or any 
other regulator) actually does follow this normative theory of regulation. 
 
Regulatory capture theory asserts that the patent office, as indeed any 
other regulator, can be pressurized by the industry, i.e. innovators, that it is 
supposed to regulate.  Organizations and groups have many forms of 






inducement. Firstly, the revolving-door phenomenon contributes strongly to 
regulators being more pliable to industry demands. The revolving door refers to 
the twin facts of regulators often having held prior jobs in the industry they are 
regulating, and the hoped-for subsequent employment of public officials with 
the regulated firms or their law-firms or public-interest law firms (Laffont and 
Tirole 1993; Djankov, La Porta et al. 2002).  Secondly, patent officers may develop 
personal relationships with firms that repeatedly patent in their area, making 
them more likely to look on their work kindly. Industries may also apply 
pressure via legislators, who control budgets. Smaller, more tightly-knit groups 
like top patenters are more likely to be able to exert power, as the benefit is 
greater and spread among fewer participants (Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983).  
 
The patent office, faces Knightian (Knight 1921) uncertainty about the 
value of patents. Innovators may have better technical knowledge of the 
likelihood of success of their own patents. Laffont and Tirole (1991) developed a 
model to show that industry had more power when it sought rules where the 
information asymmetry between industry and regulators is greater. This 
increases the likelihood that top-innovators, with the most to benefit, can lobby, 
pressure, or induce the patent office to treat them more liberally than the 
competition. This is likely to significantly distort its regulatory role.  







The patent office also faces the difficulty of responding to competing 
demands of different audiences. Among these are patent applicants and their 
competitors, political entities such as the United States Congress who control 
budgets, the courts where patents are litigated and the general public. Prior 
research on other institutions suggests that the patent office, in the face of 
uncertainty, is likely to respond by trying to maximize its legitimacy to its 
audiences to increase its likelihood of survival (Kim 2007; Carpenter 2010).  
 
In the case of the US Patent Office3, one of the most salient and powerful 
audiences is patent applicants. Patent applicants currently submit approximately 
450,000 applications a year. Furthermore, fees from these applicants entirely fund 
the US Patent Office (Merges 1999).  Critics argue that this has had adverse 
implications for the quality of patents granted. Many complaints have been made 
about the large number of low quality patents granted by the US Patent Office, 
ranging from the silly4, to the impossible,5 to the unoriginal6. Some of these are 
arguably never asserted, but others could have serious anti-competitive effects.   
                                                 
3
 Formally the US Patents and Trademarks Office. I am not concerned with Trademarks in this chapter. I 
refer to it interchangeably as the USPTO, the patent office, or the US patent office 
4
 US Patent 6022219 A method of painting on a work surface using the posterior of an infant 
5
 US Patent 6025810 Hyper-light speed antenna 
6 US Patent 5960411 – Method and system for placing a purchase order via a communications network, 
made famous as Amazon’s “1-click” patent 







There has been relatively little research on the scrutiny provided by patent 
examiners. Prior research on consistent decision making by patent offices has 
found that they are not consistent in assessing the quality of applications (Burke 
and Reitzig 2007). Some recent work (Alcacer and Gittelman 2004; Alcacer, 
Gittelman et al. 2008; Sampat 2009) has been done on examiner-added citations 
to patents, suggesting heterogeneity in the screening process.  In our work, we 
explore one possible source of inconsistency in scrutiny: the reputation of the 
firm for patenting. 
 
The Patent Process and Examiner incentives 
In this chapter we argue that, in the face of uncertainty about the value of 
patents, the examiners at the US Patent Office  tends to rely on external signals to 
decide how much screening a particular patent gets. The incentives of the US 
patent office exacerbate this. Examiners in the US Patent Office have formal 
quantitative incentives, in the form of a biweekly “production goal” of 
applications to be reviewed and actions taken (GAO 2007).  
 
The GAO’s (2007) report describes the incentives in detail, reproduced 
below 






“Patent examiners review…applications to determine if a patent is 
warranted. In making this determination, patent examiners must meet two 
specific milestones in the patent examination process: first actions and disposals.  
-First action. Patent examiners notify applicants about the patentability of 
their invention through what is called a first action. After determining if the 
invention is new and useful, or a new and useful improvement on an existing 
process or machine, patentability is determined through a thorough investigation 
of information related to the subject matter of the patent application and already 
available before the date the application was submitted, called prior art. Prior art 
includes, but is not limited to, publications and U.S. and international patents.  
-Disposal. Patent examiners dispose of a patent application by 
determining, among other things, if a patent will be granted—called allowance—
or not.  
Patent examiners receive credit, called counts, for each first action and 
disposal, and are assigned production goals (also known as quotas) on the basis 
of the number of production units—composed of two counts—they are expected 
to achieve in a 2-week period. The counts in a production unit may be any 
combination of first actions and disposals.”(GAO 2007 ,pages 10-11) It should, 






however, be noted that patent examiners also received count credits for every 




These goals vary by the examiner’s experience and their field of expertise. 
Examiners receive bonuses for exceeding their goals by 10%.  According to the 
GAO’s 2007 survey of patent examiners who have left the PTO, the biweekly 
production goals were stated as a major factor in quitting by 67% of former 
patent examiners, and 70% of examiners had worked unpaid overtime in order 
to meet their production requirements. The assumptions underlying the quotas 
had not been reviewed since 1976 (GAO 2005) and were only changed somewhat 
in 2010.  Further, there are no consequences for patent examiners if the patents 
are subsequently overturned on litigation (Langinier and Marcoul 2009), and in 
fact “no consequences for low-quality work”(GAO 2005) .  
 
As a result, patent officers are encouraged to spend as little time as 
possible scrutinizing each patent (an average of 18 hours, including all refilings 
and editing). Although the applicant may abandon the patent filing,  they can 
                                                 
7
 http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/Count_System_changes-Overview_3-8-2010.ppt   last retrieved 
Jun 30,  






continue to file amendments, and there is no way for patent examiners to 
permanently dispose of a patent application except by granting it (Thomas 2001; 
Kesan and Gallo 2006).  Patent examiners do have an incentive to get it “right 
first time”, as a good first response will likely minimize amendments, or at least 
make the amendments relatively simple to grant, as they would be in line with 
the patent examiners’ own views on the patentability of the innovation. AS their 
production quotas are purely quantitative, they also have a strong incentive to 
spend as little time on each patent as possible, and to grant patents.  This lack of 
time to probe the technical and economic value of the patent, grants the firms 
greater information asymmetry, and hence more power as they seek rules in 
their favor (Laffont and Tirole 1991).  
 
Given the salience of the applicants to the patent examiners, we contend 
that one of the most relevant external signals to the examiner is applicant firms’ 
reputation for patenting. For reputation we use the Wilson’s (1985) definition of 
reputation. Wilson defined reputation as a characteristic attributed by one actor 
(in this case the patent office, or to be more specific the patent examiner) to 
another actor (firm). Reputation is the history of the previously observed actions 
of the firm, from which future actions can be inferred (Wilson 1985).  
 






In the case of the firms we find that firms who have patented a lot in the 
past in mature fields such as drugs and pharmaceuticals, where intellectual 
property is most powerful may have a reputation for producing a lot of quality 
patents, whereas firms who patent in fields that are newer, or where patents are 
routinely ignored, such as computers and information technology (Lemley 2007) 
are likely to have a reputation for producing poorer-quality patents. 
Consequently, if patent officers are responding to these reputations we would 
anticipate less scrutiny of patent applications submitted by firms with a 
reputation for prior patenting when they submit patents in the fields of drugs 
and medicine, and greater scrutiny of applicants submitted by firms with a 
reputation for prior patenting, when they submit patents in the fields of 
computers and information technology.   
 
This article has six sections. The first section reviews prior research about 
regulatory capture, patenting and the patent office and patent examiner 
incentives.  The second section advances hypotheses concerning the relations 
between the reputations of firms applying for patents and the examiners’ 
screening of their patent applications. Methodological and results sections 
constitute the third and fourth sections. Section five discusses the significance of 
the results, whereas section six concludes the article.  








The power of regulators to coerce behavior and alter incentives faced by 
market participants (Laffont and Tirole 1993)  makes them one of the most 
important institutions in a market. Regulatory effects on markets have been a 
subject of much research, with regulatory changes frequently used as 
instrumental variables in empirical work in subjects like economics, 
organizational theory and finance. Less work has been done on the effects of 
markets on regulators and their evaluation processes (but see Kim (2007) for an 
exception).  
 
The role of the regulator in general is to maximize social welfare (Pigou 
1938). Economic welfare theory posits that  regulators act as Bayesian 
statisticians, maximizing social outcomes based on observable parameters 
(Laffont and Tirole 1993). However, many important parameters that affect the 
value of a patent such as the price, cost and production volume of the final 
product are ex-ante unobservable, especially to the patent examiner. The patent 
office faces Knightian (Knight 1921) uncertainty about the value of patents. It is 
also likely that it faces information asymmetry, in that firms are more likely to 
have knowledge of the potential economic value of patents to them, given their 






own knowledge of their internal production processes, market research, cost of 
capital etc. This information asymmetry places more power in the hands of firms 
when persuading regulators to provide favorable treatment (Laffont and Tirole 
1986; 1993). 
 
Large innovators have many means to provide incentives to regulators. 
Patent examiner incentives, as reviewed above, incentivize examiners to spend as 
little time as possible examining patents. Patent examiners are subject to 
biweekly quantitative reviews of performance (GAO 2005; GAO 2007). They 
receive credit for the initial response to the patent, and for the final disposal of a 
patent, and for first response after continuation, though not for other actions they 
may take. Thus applicants with greater financial and legal resources may 
continue to apply, thus wearing down the patent examiner, who may finally 
obtain a second count by disposing of it in the only permanent way possible, i.e. 
granting the patent(Thomas 2001; Kesan and Gallo 2006). Further, the revolving 
door process may apply here too, (though it is not clear that it does), and patent 
examiners may hope for jobs either with top innovators or their law firms 
(Djankov, La Porta et al. 2002),  thus encouraging them to treat firms with a 
reputation for patenting, favorably.  
  






 The pressure on patent examiners is not necessarily only from the 
applicants. Research on institutions argues that they face multiple audiences 
with competing demands.  For the patent office, these include not just patent 
applicants, but their competitors, political entities such as the United States 
Congress who controls budgets, the courts where patents are litigated, academics 
and the general public. While patent applicants look to secure intellectual 
property rights as broadly and as quickly as possible, their competitors would 
look to denying them these rights and legal scholars might prefer patents that 
can be consistently upheld in court (Thomas 2002). The patent office, like other 
institutions faced with competing demands and uncertainty, is likely to act in 
ways that maximize its own legitimacy in the eyes of its audiences. This 
persistent threat pushes the organization to rely on market orders and reputation 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977).  
  
One of the most salient audiences to regulators in general is that of the 
market participants who they are supposed to regulate. The focus on hierarchy 
among market participants can lead to regulatory capture by large firms with the 
most resources to lobby regulators (Stigler 1971). A less extreme explanation 
would be that the familiarity and visibility with high-status market participants 
become proxies for the underlying quality in the eyes of the regulators (Olson 






1997). The implication remains that firms with positive reputations in the eyes of 
the patent examiners due to, say a large number of prior patents in a mature 
field, may enjoy advantages in the patent review process. This advantageous 
reputation is likely to be self-sustaining as the firms continue to produce more 
patents due to the advantages provided by their current reputation 
 
Patent examination at the US Patent Office  
 
Approximately 450,000 applications are currently submitted to the US 
Patent Office each year. Though there is a duty of disclosure of prior art in the 
United States, there is no affirmative requirement that applicants conduct prior 
art searches; the incentives for applicants to do so vary across inventions and 
industries (Sampat 2009). Most patent applications (but not all) cite some prior 
patent as well as non-patent art.  
  
One issue for our analyses is whether there is any form of sorting when 
assigning applications to examiners at the US patent office. Lemley and Sampat 
(2008) provide a comprehensive account of the patent application process. In it, 
they assert that there is “some sorting of applications, but that familiarity with 






particular technologies and docket management, rather than judgments of an 
application's quality or patent-worthiness, are the dominant considerations”.  
 
The patent examiner checks the application’s claims for non-obviousness, 
searches prior art, and adds further citations if necessary. The examiner-added 
citations tend to be to the prior patent art rather than to non-patent literature8 
(Thomas 2001).  The examiner then responds to the patent applicant, a “first 
response”, for which the examiner obtains a “count”.  The application may go 
through multiple rounds of rejection and resubmission via “continuation 
applications”.  
 
Patent examiners are under intense pressure to grant patents (Thomas 
2001; Kesan and Gallo 2006).  Lemley (2001)  notes that patent examiners devote 
an average of eighteen hours per patent, including all resubmissions via 
“continuation applications”. Thomas (2001) points out that patent officers are 
required to provide written reasons for rejection, but none for acceptance and 
that the patent application can be resubmitted endlessly. There is no way to issue 
                                                 
8
 To get an idea of how varied the non-patent prior art can be, in 1964 the Dutch patent office refused to 
grant a patent to Karl Kroyer, a Danish engineer who successfully refloated a sunken ship using Ping Pong 
Balls. (British and German offices did grant the patent). Unfortunately for Kroyer, a 1949 Donald Duck 
comic The Sunken Yacht  had used exactly the same concept, and was classified, quite literally, as prior art.  
http://www.octrooicentrum.nl/index.php/component/option,com_blogplus/Itemid,417/intContent_ID,1400/ 
 - Dutch patent office statement last retrieved Jun 30, 2011, and for an English version 
http://www.iusmentis.com/patents/priorart/donaldduck/   
 






a “final rejection” and that the only way to permanently dispose of a patent 
application is to grant the patent.  
 
Given these strong incentives and a limited time to assess patents, we 
argue that patent examiners are likely to look for signals in patent applications 
that permit them to process applications as quickly as possible. Patent examiners 
might be more assured about the quality of applications conducted by firms that 
they perceive to have better reputations (Podolny and Stuart 1995). Under these 
circumstances, applications from such firms could well get lower levels of 
scrutiny9. The converse is also possibly true. Firms that have a reputation for 
applying for (and perhaps even getting) a lot of low-quality patents may find 
their applications receiving additional scrutiny. If both these patterns are the 
case, it can be argued that the patent office is acting more in a manner that 
balances it’s various competing audiences (Peltzman 1976), rather than in a 




                                                 
9
 It is axiomatic that “No one ever got fired for buying IBM”. It is quite likely that no one ever got fired for 
granting them a patent, either. 
 






Citations and Quality 
Burke & Reitzig (2007) discuss patent quality in terms of two dimensions, 
viz. techno-economic quality and legal sustainability. They argue that the first 
dimension is about only granting applications meeting a minimum level of 
technological innovation, and the second dimension about legal certainty or 
consistency, i.e. patents that are consistently upheld in court (Thomas 2002).  
They assert that patent stakeholders expect the patent office “to judge 
patentability requirements correctly against a given yardstick (i.e., economic 
dimension of quality), and reliably (or consistently) in the sense that the service 
can be trusted (i.e., legal dimension of quality)”. Critics of the US Patent Office 
have frequently argued that the patent office fails on both counts, issuing many 
low-quality patents. A large number of these complaints  center around  the 
computer industry, particularly software patents, such as the 1-click to make  
purchase patent (Allison and Lemley 1998; Merges 1999).  
 
A great deal of literature has accumulated around patent citations. One 
stream of this literature involves forward citations as a measure of the value of 
patents (Trajtenberg 1990).  Backward citations of patents to the prior art have 
also been used to measure patent quality (Narin, Noma et al. 1987). In both cases, 
more citations imply higher quality.  







A second stream involves citations as a measure of flows of knowledge, 
including regional restrictions of knowledge. This literature has treated 
examiner-added citations as noise. Alcacer, Gittelman & Sampat (2008) show that 
the signal-to-noise ratio is extremely low. They find that as many as 40% of 
citations are added by the patent examiner. They also find considerable 
heterogeneity in the number of citations added, and find that firm-level effects 
are one of the drivers of this heterogeneity.  
 
While heterogeneity in examiner-added citations is certainly driven by 
multiple factors, we contend that this heterogeneity is related to the overall 
quality of screening. As part of the patent screening process the examiner 
generally conducts a search for prior art. The number of patents added by the 
examiner, conditional on the number of patents disclosed as prior art by the 
applicant can provide a proxy for the overall quality of screening of the 
application. This would be a somewhat noisy measure over time, as the number 
of patents added would be likely to go up as search technology improves. We 
use year fixed effects in our data analysis to control for this and other time 
trends.  
 






Since patents are of differing quality, but only need to meet a threshold 
standard to be granted, “high quality” patent applications could be granted with 
little time and effort and the patent examiner could devote more time to patents 
that are nearer the threshold. While this appears obvious for the patent granting 
decision, it is not clear that this criterion applies in the search for prior art. Patent 
examiners would need to conduct a search of prior art regardless of the apparent 
quality of the patent application before them, and ensure that the patent granted 
has cited all appropriate prior art. However, the patent examiners could use the 
existing applicant citations to prior art as a signal of the intensity of search the 
applicant has already performed.   
 
Examiner-added citations can therefore be seen as a measure of the search 
performed by the examiner conditional on the references disclosed by the patent 
applicant. As such, they are a lens to examine the amount of scrutiny given to an 











As discussed previously, under conditions of uncertainty about the 
economic value of patents and the pressures on examiners to grant them, a 
patent office is likely to use established reputations of applicants as a signal of 
quality.  Wilson (1985) asserts that reputation is a future-looking statement that 
depends on past behavior. A reputation is a belief sticking to an actor based on 
(possibly noisy) observations of the actor’s prior behavior. The assumption is 
that the actor’s past behavior reveals information about future (or present) 
behavior of the actor. 
 
The question that arises then is what would be the behavior most visible 
to examiners? Since the patent office is a regulator of innovation, and patent 
examiners routinely conduct searches of the USPTO database, we argue that it 
would be the firm’s prior patenting behavior that is most salient to the patent 
examiners. The question arises- what reputation would prior patenting behavior 
confer, in the eyes of patent examiners? What reputation would benefit the firm 
and what reputation would hurt it? 
 
Institutional attention  is gained by firms that are more prominent and 
visible to the institution (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Citations by other firms to 
a focal firm’s patents are visible to the patent office. Examiners see citations made 






by the applicants and also conduct their own searches of prior art. Firms that 
turn up more often in these searches are likely to be noticed by patent examiners. 
These firms are likely to have reputations in the minds of patents examiners, for 
better or worse, regarding their patent quality.  
 
Given uncertainty about patent quality, the patent office is likely to be 
more assured about the quality of applications conducted by firms with a greater 
reputation for high-quality patenting.  The examiners are also likely to trust the 
search performed by the high-status firms and put in less effort into their own 
additional search for prior art.  
 
Whether turning up frequently in searches for prior art confers a positive 
or negative reputation for patent quality depends on the opinion of the patent 
examiner of the quality of patents in the area she examines. For example, patents 
in computer science and software receive the most criticism for bad patents and 
obviousness (Merges 1999). Patent officers are likely aware of this and a firm that 
had many patents in the prior art would have a reputation for poor-quality 
patenting in the eyes of the computer science examiner. This might likely trigger 
extra screening. Therefore we hypothesize that:  
 






H1a: Firms with more patents will have more citations added to their “Computer 
Science” patents by the patent examiner than firms with fewer patents. 
 
On the other hand, the intellectual property regime for drugs and 
medicine is well established. Brand-name drugs depend on the FDA and other 
laws to protect their monopoly products (Mossinghoff 1999; Carpenter 2010). 
Firms with a lot of patents in the prior art applying for a drug patent might well 
be perceived by a patent examiner to have a reputation for high-quality 
patenting. This would trigger reduced screening. In other words,  
 
H1b: Firms with more patents will have fewer citations added to their “Drugs 
and Medicine” patents by the patent examiner than firms with fewer patents 
 
The total number of external (non self-cite) citations to a firm’s patents in a 
prior time period would provide a measure of the focal firms’ quality of 
patenting that is visible and salient to patent examiners. However, total counts of 
citations to a firm are not directly visible in a search of the USPTO database, and 
are likely to be less salient than the number of times a firm shows up in the 
search itself.  Nevertheless, this could also be an additional measure of the 
quality of patenting, even if it is not as visible to the patent examiner.  







One of the key issues about status orders is that they are likely to be self-
perpetuating (Gould 2002). High-status firms are likely to be able to maintain 
that status over time even if their objective patent quality is no different from 
lower firms. Further, given that high-status firms might be aware of this lower 
scrutiny, they might be tempted to minimize disclosure of prior art.  An 
alternative explanation is that big firms don’t care about the quality of the 
patents issued, just the quantity (Alcacer, Gittelman et al. 2008).  If either of these 
behaviors is predominant, then we would expect: 
 
H2a: Firms with greater reputations for patent quality will cite less prior art than 
firms with lower reputations for patent quality. 
   
However, it could also be the case that high-status firms are acutely aware 
that the perception of a patent’s quality is more driven by applicant’s citing prior 
art than the firm’s status. In that case, they would be able to use their superior 
resources to conduct better searches and cite more prior art. It is possible that the 
incentives to do this vary across industry. We could expect, if this behavior is 
predominant,  
 






H2b: Firms with greater reputations for patent quality will cite more prior art 
than firms with lower reputations for patent quality 
 
For H2a and H2b, recall that a higher patent count in “Drugs and Medicine” 
implies a greater reputation for patent quality, and a higher patent count in 
“Computers and Communications” implies a lower reputation for patent quality. 
 
Data and Methods 
In this paper, we use a database of all 502, 687 original utility patents 
granted from 2001 to 2003.  The patent office has differentiated between citations 
added by the examiner and citations which were added by the applicant on the 
front page of the applications since January 2001. Similar data has been used in 
previous research on examiner added citations in several papers, notably Alcacer 
and Gittelman (2004) , Alcacer et al. (2008) and Sampat (2009). 
 
This allows us to analyze the scrutiny performed by the examiner. We also 
use the NBER patent database (Hall, Jaffe et al. 2001) to generate variables that 
characterize the firm and the technology category of each patent.  
 






Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables, calculated at the patent level. 
 
Independent & Dependent Variables 
Examiner screening.  Examiner screening is measured in terms of the effort put 
into the search for patent citations.  Lemley and Sampat (2008) have shown that 
the examiner’s propensity to add citations is inversely correlated with his or her 
propensity to grant patents. To measure examiner screening as a dependent 
variable, we use the count of examiner citations. We use this measure since in 
over 30% of cases, there are no applicant citations. The examiner share is 
therefore 100%, regardless of the examiner’s actual search. In over 70%, there are 
fewer than 7 applicant citations, skewing the examiner share of citations. We use 
the number of applicant citations as a control variable in regressions involving 
examiner screening. Since the examiner citations are a count with over-
dispersion we estimate a negative binomial regression (Hausman, Hall et al. 
1984)  
    
Yi = βXi + εi 
 
Where Yi is the number of examiner citations on the ith patent. 






Xi is a matrix of examiner and application characteristics. 
Robust standard errors are used to adjust for clustering of the standard errors 
around the examiner.  
We also do the regressions separately for each of the 6 major technology classes 
(explained below), to differentiate between the different effects expected in 
different technological areas 
 
Applicant disclosure.  We use the number of citations provided by the applicant to 
measure the applicant disclosure of prior patent art.  This is used in different 
regressions as a dependent and as an independent variable.  
 
To estimate the effects of firm characteristics on disclosure of prior art, we 
use the same method as above, estimating a negative binomial regression model  
 
Yi = βXi + εi 
 
Where Yi is the number of examiner citations on the ith patent. 
Xi is a matrix of application characteristics. 
However, in this case it is not necessary to adjust for clustering of the standard 
errors around the examiner, as examiner characteristics are not relevant.  We also 






do the regressions for each of the 6 major technology classes (explained below), 




Firm reputation for patent quality: Previous research shows that some institutions 
use the reputation  of ‘client’ firms to guide their behaviors in the face of 
uncertainty (Podolny and Stuart 1995; Kim 2007) . We use two measures of the 
prominence of client firms in the eyes of the patent office. First, with the help of 
the NBER patent database, we use the number of patents the firm has had 
granted in the previous five years. This measures a firm’s experience as well as 
its prominence to the patent office. We also use the external citations to a firm’s 
work. External citations to a firm’s work in prior years are used as a way of 
determining the position of firms in knowledge space (Podolny, Stuart et al. 
1996). We use the NBER patent database (Hall, Jaffe et al. 2001) to generate the 
number of citations to a firm’s patents in the previous five years, deliberately 
excluding self-citations. Since examiners view patent citations added by the 
applicant, search prior art and add citations, we would expect that firms who 
they come across regularly in their searches are more visible and possess a 
reputation in the eyes of patent examiners. However, we note that what that 






reputation is, depends upon the overall reputation of quality that patents in that 
field has, viz. higher prominence in searches and citations in the area of 
Computer Science is likely to confer a negative reputation, whereas higher 
prominence in the area of Drugs and Medical patents is likely to confer a positive 
reputation. 
 
One of the issues with both these measures of firm prominence is that they 
are very highly skewed. For example, while 27% of patents come from firms that 
have no patents at all, 10% of patents (50,681) come from 13 firms with over 5200 
patents each in the previous 5 years. Citations are even more skewed, with the 
top 5% of patents coming from 7 firms over 51,700 cites from other firms to their 
prior art in the previous 5 years.  
To deal with this, we use the log of prior patent counts plus one and prior 




Whether the firm has patented before: The resources of firms differ greatly, but the 
fact that a firm has had a patent granted in the five-year window before indicates 






some recent familiarity with the patenting process and a minimum level of 
resources available to pursue the patent. 
 
Whether the firm’s work was cited before: Citations to patents are a highly variable, 
but having at least one citation indicates that some other firm has built on the 
firm’s patent, indicating at least a minimum level of quality for the firm’s patents 
(Trajtenberg 1990). 
 
Country of origin: The effect of a non-US country could be driven by several 
things.  Applications from other countries may conform less to US Patent norms, 
and may be driven by the norms of the host country. They might therefore invite 
more careful scrutiny and exhibit more citations. On the other hand, the 
examination might have undergone prior screening by another patent office. In 
that case, additional citations made by that office show up in the data as 
applicant citations to prior art. Further, inventors willing to accept the additional 
costs of applying for and maintaining patents in an additional country may 
indicate a superior application (Lanjouw and Lerner 1997). We report a single 
variable for non-US countries, and in robustness checks, use country fixed effects 
to control for this effect. 
 






Technology Categories: we use the thirty-six technology categories used in the 
NBER database.  Each patent, based on its patent class, is assigned to a 
technology group (6) and subcategory (36) using the crosswalk data provided in 
the NBER database.  We used technology fixed effects in all the overall 
regressions at the technology subcategory level. (Tables 2 and 4) 
 
Class categories: We use the 421 patent classes for the technology as fixed effects in 
the regressions that are done in each technology category. (Tables 3 and 5)  
 
Time trends: The number of patents added is likely to go up as search technology 
improves over time. We use year fixed effects in all regressions to control for this 




Tables 2-5 provide the results of the regression analyses. Tables 2 and 3 
shows the factors that affect applicant-added citations. We see from the dummy 
variable for patenting that firms that have patented tend to cite more prior art. 
This holds true across all technological characteristics. This is consistent with the 






idea that firms that have patenting experience are more likely to know how to 
craft applications, have resources to conduct searches and cite prior art.  
 
However, firms that patent a lot, tend to cite less prior art.  This holds true 
for four of the six categories. This implies that prominent firms are less inclined 
to cite prior art, supporting Hypothesis 2a. Interestingly, in the technological area 
of chemicals, we find that prominent firms are more inclined to cite prior art, 
supporting Hypothesis 2b. We find no result in the “Others category”. 
Firm citations do not appear to hold a similar pattern. Having some work good 
enough to receive a citation in the previous five years is correlated with a 
propensity to cite more prior patent art. However, receiving a large number of 
citations, a sign of a prominent firm, is not correlated with citing less prior patent 
art, as the effects appear equally split between positive effects, negative effects 
and no effect. Application citations do not appear to be very sensitive to the 
citations to the firms’ prior art. 
 
We find a strong negative effect for foreign inventors, supporting the suggestion 
that foreign inventors’ lack of familiarity with the US Patents and their own 
countries’ differing ‘duty of disclosure’ norms could cause them to cite less prior 
US patent art. 







Tables 4 and 5 show the factors that affect the number of citations added 
by the examiner to the patent. The effect of applicant citations on examiner 
citations is, in general very slightly negative (4.7)  and (5.1-5.6) This is consistent 
with Sampat (2009),  and it indicates that there is very little incentive for the 
applicant to add citations to prior patent art. Clearly, failing to disclose prior art 
is very unlikely to result in the examiner adding that citation. This is some 
indication that the examiners are satisficing - meeting some internal norm on 
what constitutes an adequate search of the prior literature. This is only slightly 
related to the applicant citations – prior work (Alcacer, Gittelman et al. 2008) 
shows that firm fixed effects explain most of the variation in examiner-added 
citations.  
 
We find that firms that have patented in the previous 5 years are less 
likely to receive examiner citations in 4 of 6 technological categories, (5.2-5.5).  
 
Firms that have patented a lot, however elicit differing levels of scrutiny 
depending on which technological area the patent application is in.  
Firms that have patented a lot ,applying for  “Drugs and Medical” patents, 
are even less likely to receive examiner citations, even after controlling for 






applicant citations. This provides support for H1b. This also appears to be true 
for “Chemical” and “Others”. However, for “Computers and Communications” 
and “Electrical and Electronics”, firms that have patented a lot have their patent 
applications subjected to extra scrutiny. This provides support for hypothesis 
H1a.  
 
This is to be seen in light of Tables 2 and 3, showing that firms that have 
had more patents issued in the previous 5 years are less likely to disclose prior 
art in the first place, across the board. The exception seems to be Chemical, 
where firms are more inclined to disclose prior art.  
 
Firms that are highly cited are likely to have more citations added by the 
examiner in some categories but not others. They are more likely to have 
citations added in “Drugs and Medical” This doesn’t support Hypothesis 1a. 
There is no effect for being highly cited in “Computers and Communication”. 
This doesn’t support Hypothesis 1b.  
In conclusion, we find support for Hypothesis 1a and 1b and support for 
Hypothesis 2a, when looking at the prior patenting record of firms. We don’t 
find support for any of the hypotheses when looking at the patterns of citation to 






the prior patents of the firms. We only find support for Hypothesis 2b in the 
technological area of chemicals 
 
Discussion 
 From the regressions, we observe that high-reputation firms cite less 
patent prior art than low-reputation firms and individual inventors. Yet, patent 
examiners are likely to add fewer cites to patents granted to high-reputation 
firms, conditional on the number of applicant-added citations. This clearly 
implies reduced scrutiny to patents of high-reputation firms. The exception 
appears to be occurring in the Chemicals field, where high-reputation firms have 
lower scrutiny, but appear to add more applicant citations themselves. This 
would imply relatively efficient functioning on the part of examiners, and a sub-
study of this area, and the differences between chemicals and other fields (more 
mature, better definitions of what is patentable) deserves exploration of it’s own 
in some depth in future research. 
The simplest explanation is that, as predicted by regulatory capture theory 
and theories of bureaucratic legitimacy, examiners are indeed giving benefits to 
high-reputation firms. However, firms that have, in effect, gained a poor 
reputation by patenting in certain fields, such as Computer Science and 
Electronics elicit a small amount of added scrutiny, though this effect is smaller 






than their reduction in applicant citations. In this, examiners are performing 
more of a balancing act conducive to legitimacy explanations (Kim 2007; 
Carpenter 2010)and more general regulatory capture explanations (Peltzman 
1976; Laffont and Tirole 1991) 
 An alternative explanation is that higher-reputation companies 
systematically obtain patents that intrinsically require fewer total citations to the 
existing prior art. In our regressions, we observe that high-reputation firms add 
fewer applicant citations than lower-reputation inventors, and yet they have 
fewer examiner-added citations to the prior patent literature.  
In this explanation, the examiners systematically cite less prior art because 
there is less prior art to be found. However prior research shows that fewer 
patent cites to prior art indicates  lower economic value (Narin, Noma et al. 1987) 
i.e. a lower patent quality. This explanation would imply that higher-status 
companies systematically obtain lower-quality patents. This would again imply 
the examiner granting some benefits to firm status. (Again, Chemicals appears to 
be exempted from all this). 
 
 
These findings have strategic implications for firms heavily involved in 
innovation and patenting. For example, firms can have different approaches to 






patenting, analogous to r/K strategies in evolutionary biology (MacArthur and 
Wilson 1967; Schneider 2007). Some firms (r-strategists) focus on submitting 
many applications with a relatively low probability of success (Schneider 2007); 
others may focus on fewer high-quality patents.  It has been argued that both 
bigger and smaller firms could be K-strategists. It’s possible that bigger firms are 
more interested in higher quality patents as they hope to reap technological 
benefits and would want them to withstand challenge. On the other hand, 
smaller firms may wish to sell or license their patents and may want them to be 
more resistant to legal challenge, whereas large firms are more interested in 
quantity rather than quality of patents. (Alcacer, Gittelman et al. 2008).  
 
Regardless of size, these results indicate that there might be some benefits 
to the r-strategy in certain technological areas, but not in others.  
 
In forthcoming research, we will look at the patent examiner’s response to 
different indicators of status. One of the areas we intend to explore is the 
relationship between patent attorneys and scrutiny. A firm that invests in high-
quality attorneys could be signaling its quality of patent or its willingness to 
persist in getting the patents approved.  
 






We also intend to incorporate other measures of quality to better assess 
the magnitude of the status benefit orthogonal to quality. One good measure of 
patent quality would be to analyze the subset of patents that have been litigated 
and see if they were sustained or overturned (Thomas 2002). Another measure is 
whether the patent has been granted by other patent offices. For example, the 
European Patent Office (EPO) is widely regarded to have higher standards of 
innovation than the US Patent Office. In an analysis by Lemley and Sampat 
(2008), almost 90% of the patents approved by the EPO had been approved by 
the US Patent Office, whereas less than 50% of the patents approved by the US 
Patent Office  had been approved by the EPO. These more accurate measures of 
assessing the quality of the patents would help in finding the magnitude of the 
benefit that is due to the component of firm reputation that is orthogonal to the 
quality of the application.  
 
Conclusions 
We find that there appear to be positive returns to a firm reputation for 
high-quality patenting at the patent office, as well as negative returns to a 
reputation for low-quality patenting. Patent examiners subject patent 
applications by high-reputation firms to less scrutiny. Further, many of these 
firms appear to be aware of this, giving them even less incentive to disclose prior 






art. This appears to create a self-sustaining cycle that is beneficial to high-
reputation firms and detrimental to those who do not possess that reputation in 
the eyes of the patent office. This is potentially anti-competitive and not 
consistent with stakeholders’ expectation of a consistent and reliable process of 
patent scrutiny.  












Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Applicant citations to US patents 7.37 18.88 0 778 
Examiner citations to US patents 5.21 4.81 0 416 
Firm patents in the previous 5 years 1,291.39 2,642.94 0 14,988 
Cites from other firms to patenting firms' portfolio in 
previous 5 years 9,492.48 22,936.46 0 152,375 
     
Dummy Variables     
Firm has patented in the previous 5 years 0.727 0.445 0 1 
Firm's work has been cited  by other firms in previous 5 
years 0.692 0.461 0 1 
Non-US Firm 0.477 0.499 0 1 








Table 2: Applicant Search 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV - Applicant added citations 
Log( Prior 5 years’ 
patents+ 1) 
-0.080** -0.255** -0.294** -0.258** -0.187** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Firm patented(1/0)in 
prior 5 years 
 0.712** 0.559** 0.529** 0.471** 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Firm has been cited 
(1/0) in prior 5 years 
  0.308** 0.341** 0.249** 
   (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
Log(Prior  5 years’ 
citations to firm 
patents +1) 
   -0.032** -0.017** 
    (0.006) (0.005) 
Non-US Firm (1/0)     -1.305** 
     (0.005) 
Constant 2.211** 1.971** 1.943** 1.939** 2.465** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) 
Observations 492895 492895 492895 492895 492895 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%        
All regressions include dummies for 36 NBER Technological categories  
All regressions include year dummies. 
Logs are to base 10. 






Table 3: Applicant Search by Technology Area 
 
DV - Applicant added citations 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) 









Log( Prior 5 
years’ patents+ 
1) 
0.097** -0.418** -0.247** -0.312** -0.170** -0.031 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.039) (0.033) (0.030) (0.040) 
Firm 
patented(1/0)in 
prior 5 years 
0.175** 0.576** 0.617** 0.458** 0.408** 0.397** 
 (0.044) (0.054) (0.047) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) 
Firm has been 
cited (1/0) in 
prior 5 years 
0.188** 0.301** 0.106* 0.116** 0.230** 0.372** 
 (0.038) (0.049) (0.042) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) 
Log(Prior  5 
years’ citations 
to firm patents 
+1) 
-0.133** 0.080** 0.044 0.077** -0.002 -0.113** 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.022) (0.029) 
Non-US Firm 
(1/0) 
-1.347** -1.136** -1.107** -1.358** -1.372** -1.407** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Constant 1.299** 3.090** 2.192** 2.233** 3.006** 1.219 
 (0.023) (0.247) (0.131) (0.244) (0.508) (0.714) 
Observations 68997 98849 56404 106295 85338 77012 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
All regressions include dummies for 421 NBER Technological classes 
All regressions include year dummies. 
Logs are to base 10. 






 Table 4: Examiner Scrutiny 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering around the 
examiners.) 
All regressions include dummies for 36 NBER Technological categories  
All regressions include year dummies. 
Logs are to base 10. 
 
DV- Examiner-added citations 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) 
Applicant 
citations 
-0.002** -0.002** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log( Prior 5 
years’ 
patents+ 1) 
 -0.025** -0.027** -0.005 -0.004 -0.022** -0.016** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log ( Prior 5 
years’ 
patents +1) * 
applicant 
citations 
  0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm 
patented(1/0
)in prior 5 
years 
   -0.087** -0.086** -0.072** -0.072** 






    -0.001 -0.016* -0.015* 
    (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 





     0.015** 0.012** 
     (0.004) (0.004) 
Non-US 
Firm (1/0) 
      -0.079** 
      (0.005) 
Constant 
1.213** 1.252** 1.254** 1.283** 1.283** 1.283** 1.324** 
(0.118) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) 
Observation
s 
492895 492895 492895 492895 492895 492895 492895 






Table 5: Examiner Scrutiny by Technological Area 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering around the 
examiners.) 
All regressions include dummies for 421 NBER classes 
All regressions include year dummies. 
Logs are to base 10. 
DV- Examiner-added citations 










 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) 
Applicant citations 
-0.003** -0.001* -0.003** -0.002** -0.004** -0.006** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log( Prior 5 years’ 
patents+ 1) 
-0.035** 0.018* 0.019* -0.069** -0.009 -0.026* 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.010) (0.013) 
Log ( Prior 5 years’ 
patents +1) * 
applicant citations 
0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001** -0.001 0.001* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm patented(1/0)in 
prior 5 years 
-0.009 -0.034* -0.037* -0.067* -0.031*   -0.026 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.014) (0.016) 
Firm has been cited 
(1/0) in prior 5 years 
-0.005 0.035** -0.006 -0.033 -0.003 -0.051** 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.029) (0.011) (0.014) 
Log(Prior  5 years’ 
citations to firm 
patents +1) 
0.023* -0.009 -0.006 0.049** 0.003 0.019* 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) 
Non-US Firm (1/0) 
-0.042** -0.056** -0.073** -0.061** -0.075** -0.096** 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 
2.064** 1.259** 1.172** 1.702** 2.100** 1.447* 
(0.254) (0.154) (0.244) (0.156) (0.018) (0.686) 
Observations 68997 98849 106295 56404 85338 77012 






Chapter 3: Which drugs obtain the Pediatric Exclusivity Provision  
Abstract 
Pediatric exclusivity is designed to reward companies for conducting 
pediatric trials for dosage and safety with 6 months’ extra monopoly on their 
drug. We find that companies appear to base the decision to conduct pediatric 
trials almost solely on the basis of current sales (and hence presumably future 
projected revenue). We find the threshold for a sharply increased probability of 
obtaining pediatric exclusivity is annual sales of $260 mn in the prior year We 
estimate, very conservatively, that the total liability to consumers is US$ 21 
billion as of end 2007.  
We also find, in accordance with prior criticism, that, (barring ADHD 
drugs, which are marketed primarily to minors) even after controlling for the  
total sales, the proportion of sales to minors does not affect the probability of 
obtaining pediatric exclusivity. This is in concordance with regulatory capture 
theory which would suggest that a powerful group (i.e.. brand-name drug 
manufacturers ) influenced Congress to pass this legislation to procure a benefit 
for themselves with a not-easily perceived cost to the much more diffuse group 
of pharmaceutical customers who pay brand-name prices for 6 more months as a 
result of delayed generic entry. 
 








The power of regulators to coerce behavior and alter incentives faced by 
market participants (Laffont and Tirole 1993)  makes them one of the most 
important institutions in a market.  The United States’ Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) regulates, among others, the pharmaceutical industry 
which had annual sales of over $130 billion10 in 2007. The FDA is an exceptionally 
powerful regulator and exerts a strong influence on the revenue streams of 
pharmaceutical firms. It must approve all drugs before they can be sold in the 
US, its decisions are effectively binding and very expensive to contest (Carpenter 
2004)and it can grant market exclusivity for drugs over and beyond the 
intellectual property rights granted by patent law. In this chapter, we examine 
one such regulation that extends market exclusivity – the Pediatric Exclusivity 
provision.  
 
Pediatric exclusivity  
The Pediatric Exclusivity provision was created by Section 111 of Title I of 
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, which 
in turn created section  505A of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
                                                 
10
 2007 sales data from the dataset used in this chapter 






U.S.C. 355a). Section 505A permits applications to obtain an additional 6 months 
of market exclusivity if the sponsor submits requested information relating to the 
use of the active moiety in the pediatric population (FDA Guidance for Industry 
1999).  
  
 Under the FDAMA, firms are rewarded with 6 months of additional 
market exclusivity for conducting studies specified by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in pediatric populations. Pediatric exclusivity attaches a 6 
month period of exclusivity to the patent or market exclusivity already held by 
the firm.  It attaches to every drug that the firm holds that contains the studied 
active moiety for which pediatric exclusivity has been granted.   
 
 As such it is potentially a powerful incentive for companies to conduct 
pediatric studies. In order to qualify for pediatric exclusivity, all that is required 
is that the studies agreed between the company and the FDA be conducted. 
There is no requirement that the studies have to be published, or that label 
changes must be made to the drugs. Publishing is at the discretion of the firm, 
and label changes are made only if the studies deem them necessary (FDA 
Guidance for Industry 1999). If no label changes are necessary, the firm 
nevertheless obtains the six month exclusivity provision.  







The FDA pediatric exclusivity provision follows on from earlier legal 
efforts to stimulate innovation in pharmaceutical research using market 
exclusivity provisions.  These included the Orphan Drug Act(1983) , the 
Waxman-Hatch Act(1984), and the Prescription Drug Fee User Act(1992) 
(Kesselheim 2010). The Orphan Drug Act (1983) granted seven years’ market 
exclusivity to drugs that treated rare diseases.(Public Law 97-414) 
 
The Waxman-Hatch Act (1984) is often credited with stimulating a vast 
and robust expansion in the availability of generic drugs in the US. (Grabowski 
and Vernon 1996; Mossinghoff 1999; Karki 2005).  The Waxman-Hatch Act made 
it considerably easier to obtain approval for generic drugs that were 
bioequivalent to brand-name drugs whose protections had expired. The Act also 
created two market exclusivity extensions. First, it increased the effective time of 
market exclusivity by adding back some time lost in clinical trials and FDA 
review process. . Grabowski and Vernon’s (2000) study found that this effectively 
added a total of two years to market exclusivity. The second extension was a 6-
month extension for a generic manufacturer that successfully challenged a weak 
patent, designed to stimulate generic challenges on current brand-name 
pharmaceuticals (21 U.S.C. 365 bb(a)(2)). This extension has been criticized for 






delaying the entry of generic pharmaceuticals (Korn, Lietzan et al. 2009). Brand 
name manufacturers can and do pay the generic manufacturer that challenged 
the patent to refrain from marketing the drug within the 180-day generic 
exclusivity period (Hemphill 2006). 
 
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (1992) responded to consumer and 
industry concerns about lengthy pharmaceutical reviews by reducing the FDA’s 
review period, setting a deadline of 1 year and permitting application fees to be 
collected. This effectively increased the protected period for brand-name drugs. 
(Kesselheim 2010)  
 
Rationale for the pediatric exclusivity provision 
 
The pediatric exclusivity extension was provided to stimulate clinical 
studies in pediatric populations. Historically, efficacy and safety trials have been 
usually performed on adult populations.  Children normally do not participate in 
clinical trials. There are scientific, ethical and commercial challenges. As children 
grow, their body size and composition, physiology, and cognitive and motor 
function change. The metabolism and toxicity of medications can vary 
substantially in children of different ages (Steinbrook 2002).  Pediatric studies in 






adolescents (12 to 16 years of age) may therefore not provide adequate data for, 
say, infants (1 month-2 years).  This creates the requirement for multiple studies 
across different age groups.  This increases the cost of the studies making 
pediatric studies relatively expensive compared with the size of the potential market. 
Further complications often cited include the difficulty of finding enough 
patients to participate, and inadequate numbers of quality pediatric 
pharmacology investigators (Caldwell, Murphy et al. 2004).  
 
The ethical issues associated with studying children are complex. 
Informed consent of children’s parents is not the same as consent of an adult 
(Committee on Bioethics 1995) . As a result federal regulations impose a greater 
oversight role on review boards for pediatric trials versus adult trials.  
(Steinbrook 2002). All these issues add up to fewer pediatric trials, and fewer 
patients in individual pediatric trials, thus giving them less statistical power than 
for adult patients. 
 
This translates into a lack of dosage and safety information for pediatric 
patients on the drug labels. Doctors wishing to prescribe these drugs for children 
must prescribe them “off-label”, i.e. for a purpose or to a population that has not 
been specifically approved in clinical trials by the FDA.  The FDA has long 






maintained the general position that although physicians may freely prescribe 
drugs for off-label uses, drug manufacturers may not promote such uses. (Mello, 
Studdert et al. 2009). Clinical practice on pediatric populations has often 
involved “off-label” prescriptions. (Conroy, Choonara et al. 2000; McIntyre, 
Conroy et al. 2000; 't Jong, Eland et al. 2002; O'Donnell, Stone et al. 2002; Schirm, 
Tobi et al. 2003).  
 
  To address the issue of a lack of pediatric information, the FDA first 
published a pediatric rule in 1979 requiring pediatric dosage information. This 
was followed by a rule in 1994 requiring manufacturers to survey their current 
data to determine if any pediatric dosage information was given. Neither of these 
rules succeeded in providing much information – in the case of the 1994 rule,  
because there were so few studies being conducted on children, the only 
statement that  was added to the labeling in most cases was one similar to the 
following: "Safety and  effectiveness in pediatric patients  below the age of  
<weeks/years/months> has not been established." (Cooper 2002) 
 
In 1998, the FDA added a new Pediatric Rule that granted it the power to 
require studies from manufacturers of drugs if there is a substantial use in the 
pediatric population or the significant therapeutic benefit. Currently, however, 






the FDA “will not require studies of approved drugs except if approved by the 
Center Director. Instead, FDA will seek to have manufacturers voluntarily 
submit studies for marketed drugs under the incentives provided by FDAMA”. 
(i.e. pediatric exclusivity)11  
 
Obtaining pediatric exclusivity 
In order for pediatric exclusivity to be granted, the FDA must first issue a 
Written Request for pediatric studies. It is important to note that a firm may (and 
in our data, most often does) request a Written Request for pediatric studies from 
the FDA.  Once the FDA has issued the Written Request, the firm responds, and 
the firm and the FDA negotiate the terms of the pediatric studies to be conducted 
(FDA Guidance for Industry 1999).  This can be a long-drawn out process, taking 
several years, including requests for extensions of deadlines. 
 
If the firm wishes to obtain exclusivity, it must provide results of studies 
that take place after the written request is issued. Once the FDA accepts the 
studies as a sufficient response to the written request, any label changes required 
are made and pediatric exclusivity is granted. Note that there is no requirement 
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to make public or publish these studies in scientific journals, and that in practice, 
dissemination of these studies is limited (Benjamin, Smith et al. 2006)  
 
This paper is organized into five  parts. In the first part, we introduced the 
concept of pediatric exclusivity and provide background information. In the 
second part we review the extant relevant literature on regulators and regulatory 
capture and deduce our hypotheses. In the third part we explain our data and 
methods. In the fourth part we present our results and findings. In the fifth and 
final part we discuss our findings and discuss our conclusions.  
 
Theory 
As we discussed in the introduction, pediatric exclusivity provides for a 6-
month extension of current market protection provided by patents and other 
market exclusivities granted by the FDA.  The value of this extension can be 
considerable.   
 
Pigou’s (1938)  theory of public interest regulation holds that markets 
exhibit failures such as externalities and monopoly power. Regulation is 
therefore used by governments to serve the general interest of society and 
maximize social welfare (McCraw 1975)  In this view, the institutions that 






regulate the market are viewed as Bayesian statisticians, optimizing welfare, 
frequently under incomplete information conditions. (Laffont and Tirole 1986).  
 
Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action where incentives to organize are 
higher for small groups with high stakes that are spread among fewer actors, 
was used by Stigler (1971) to develop the idea that an industry with few 
producers would be able to influence actors more than widely disbursed 
consumer groups. Peltzman (1976) accounted for the fact that the United States 
Congress occasionally passes laws that hurt large businesses and reduce 
protectionism by developing a model that balanced interest group support and 
voter group support to legislators. Laffont and Tirole (1991) pointed out that 
groups seeking to produce legislation that increased information asymmetry had 
even more power. This regulatory capture model predicts legislation that favors 
small powerful groups with information advantages over large diffuse groups.  
 
Pediatric exclusivity legislation appears at first to fit this model. It favors 
incumbent brand-name drugs against generic competitors with valuable 6-month 
extensions. Brand-name drugs depend on monopoly pricing for profitability. It is 
notable that pediatric exclusivity is a “carrot” rule, providing an incentive with 






no “sticks” or penalties for not providing pediatric information, an option that is 
always open to the firm. 
 
Coercive rules had been attempted before to address the issue of a lack of 
pediatric information. The FDA first published a pediatric rule in 1979 requiring 
pediatric dosage information. This was followed by a rule in 1994 requiring 
manufacturers to survey their current data to determine if any pediatric dosage 
information was given. Neither of these rules succeeded in providing much 
information – in the case of the 1994 rule,  because there were so few studies 
being conducted on children, the only statement that  was added to the labeling 
in most cases was one similar to the following: "Safety and  effectiveness in 
pediatric patients  below the age of  <weeks/years/months> has not been 
established." (Cooper 2002) 
 
In 1998, the FDA added a new Pediatric Rule that granted it the power to 
require studies from manufacturers of drugs if there is a substantial use in the 
pediatric population or the significant therapeutic benefit. Currently, however, 
the FDA “will not require studies of approved drugs except if approved by the 
Center Director. Instead, FDA will seek to have manufacturers voluntarily 
submit studies for marketed drugs under the incentives provided by FDAMA”. 






(i.e. pediatric exclusivity)12 . Again the pattern appears to be that Congress and 
the FDA will not apply rules that force the pharmaceutical companies into doing 
pediatric studies, without any monetary benefit.  
 
It has been argued the benefits of the drugs towards children and 
pediatric prescriptions are worth the cost (although we have not found any 
estimate for the cost to consumer in the extant literature) This argument has been 
made by several groups including the American Association for Pediatricians 
(Cooper 2002), as well as strongly criticized in academic literature. (Benjamin, 
Smith et al. 2006; Boots, Sukhai et al. 2007). We make a first attempt at finding 
out what this cost is in the current chapter and will assess the pediatric benefits 
in the next chapter.  
 
The benefit-cost ratio of pediatric exclusivity can be enormously favorable. 
Li et al.  found that median costs per written request of pediatric studies for a 
cohort of drugs in 2002-04 were approximately $12mn (range $5-$44 million). As 
against these costs, the benefits to the firm depend on the anticipated profits 
during those extra 6 months with exclusivity protection versus the anticipated 
profits without it.  “Blockbuster” drugs are those whose sales exceed $1bn a year, 
                                                 
12
 Frequently Asked Questions of Pediatric Exclusivity, The Pediatric “Rule” and their Interaction 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DevelopmentResources/ucm077915.htm 






providing an extra $500 million in sales during an additional six months of 
exclusivity.  
 
Brand-name drugs are exceedingly dependent on these monopoly 
protections. Generic competition can severely dent the market share of the drug.  
After generic entry, generic prices fall to between 35% and 40% of the brand-
name drug in two years, and subsequently to about 10-20% of the brand-name 
drug (Grabowski and Vernon 1992; Frank and Salkever 1997).  Brand name drugs 
typically do not respond by dropping their prices, but lose market share. 
 
Grabowski and Vernon (1996) in their study on the effectiveness of the 
Waxman-Hatch Act found that,  for the 1984-85 cohort of generic entrants, brand 
name drugs typically retained 55% of the market share two years after going 
generic. By the 1991-92 cohort, this had dropped to 28%.  They attributed this to 
increased price-sensitivity brought about by managed care. Mortimer’s (1997) 
work supported these conclusions by finding that demand for drugs in managed 
care is more price-elastic than in other sectors, such as the demand by patients 
who pay the entire cost of drugs themselves.  
 






The market share retained by the brand-name drugs is also affected by the 
original market size. The greater the original market size, the lower the market 
share retained by the brand-name drug. (Grabowski and Vernon 1992; 
Grabowski and Vernon 1996; Saha, Grabowski et al. 2006).  
 
Saha, Grabowski et al. (2006) found that the number of generic entrants 
strongly affects market share retained by the brand name drug. Of those with 20 
or more entrants, on average the brand name drug retained 20% of market share 
within one year of losing its market exclusivity protections. Saha, Grabowski et 
al. (2006)and Scott Morton (2000) also found that market size (i.e. brand-name 
drug sales prior to expiry of exclusivity protections) increased  the likelihood of 
generic entry.   
 
Thus we see a strong market threat to brand name drugs, i.e. generic 
competition. A 6-month delay can be very valuable to the brand-name 
pharmaceutical industry, and , coupled with the exceedingly low cost of 
conducting the trials relative to the potential benefits is potentially evidence of 
regulatory capture.  
 
 







The attractiveness of a drug’s current sales to potential generic 
competitors, and the inability of brand-name drugs to maintain market share in 
the face of stiff price competition from generic manufacturers increase the 
potential value of the 6 -month pediatric exclusivity as the sales of the drug 
increases. We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
H1: The higher (lower) the sales of a drug, the greater(lesser) the 
likelihood of obtaining pediatric exclusivity.  
 
The primary stated rationale behind pediatric exclusivity is to stimulate 
pediatric drug trials in patients. One of the key criticisms of pediatric exclusivity 
is that the pediatric studies conducted for pediatric exclusivity are conducted 
with the primary purpose of increasing exclusivity for drugs that have a large 
market in the adult population (Boots, Sukhai et al. 2007) . As adults represent 
over 90% of the sales of drugs, any drug with a large market would primarily sell 
to the adult population. Boots, Sukhai et al.’s (2007) study described prescription 
patterns across different categories of drugs and found that the majority of drugs 
granted pediatric exclusivity are those that treat central nervous system, 
cardiovascular, alimentary, and metabolism disorders, all of which are relatively 






rarely used by children. Drug categories frequently used by children, such as 
respiratory drugs, anti-infectives for systemic use, and dermatologicals are 
underrepresented in the pediatric trial data. These findings are entirely 
consistent with regulatory capture theory (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976), as the 
legislation does not require that drugs are primarily marketed to children, only 
that the required clinical trials have been conducted. 
 
However, once we control for the total sales of the drug, we would find 
that a larger proportion of pediatric populations would imply higher total 
prescriptions (and consequently, sales attributed to those prescriptions) that are 
occurring off-label. Companies that wish to aggressively market pediatric uses of 
drugs, particularly to consumers, would therefore be more likely to seek 
pediatric exclusivity. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
H2a: Controlling for total sales, the higher (lower) the proportion of 
prescriptions of a drug to minors, the greater(lesser) the likelihood of the firm 
conducting the necessary studies and obtaining pediatric exclusivity 
And 
 






H2b: Controlling for total sales, the higher(lower) the proportion of 
sales of a drug to minors, the greater(lesser) the likelihood of the firm 
conducting the necessary studies obtaining pediatric exclusivity 
 
The FDA had historically restricted drug companies from promoting off-
label uses of their drugs. However, according to the latest guidance, companies 
are allowed to distribute peer-reviewed scientific articles and texts describing 
off-label uses to medical practitioners, subject to certain conditions, primarily 
regarding accuracy, completeness of the article, not highlighting any sections and 
separation of the articles from promotional materials (Mello, Studdert et al. 
2009). This would certainly give the firms more leeway in promoting off-label 
use and might attenuate the effects anticipated above in H2a and H2b.   
 
We recall that pediatric exclusivity adds only to the end of the current 
period of market protection (via patents or other exclusivity provisions). It is 
likely that firms would be able to estimate the economic benefits of pediatric 
exclusivity (i.e. predicted sales and hence profits during the extra six months of 
exclusivity) more accurately the nearer the date of expiry of current market 
exclusivity.  The firms would be able to carry out more accurate cost-benefit 
analyses. This leads us to hypothesize that: 






H3: The less (more) the time to expiry of exclusivity, the greater (lesser) 
the likelihood of obtaining pediatric exclusivity. 
 
Data and Methods 
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) is conducted annually by 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, part of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services. The Household Component of the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS-HC) is designed to produce national 
and regional estimates of the health care use, expenditures, sources of payment, 
and insurance coverage of the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population.  The 
sample design of the survey includes stratification, clustering, multiple stages of 
selection, and disproportionate sampling (Machlin, Yu et al. 2005) . We use data 
from the Household Component of the MEPS from 1996 to 2007 to compute 
prescription counts and expenditures. The MEPS sample size differs each year 
and ranges from 8,655 families (21,571 individuals) to 14,828 families (37,418 
individuals) in our dataset.  
 
The data from the household components of MEPS was merged with new 
drug application data from the FDA Electronic Orangebook. As the FDA 
Orangebook only holds data for all currently valid therapeutics, Multum Lexicon 






was also used to provide data for some drugs that had appeared in the 
household survey but had expired. Pediatric exclusivity data was obtained from 
the FDA Orangebook and crosschecked with the FDA list of drugs granted 
pediatric exclusivity13. Expenditure data from MEPS covered a total of 519 drugs. 
155 drugs were granted exclusivity by Dec 31, 2009.  
 
Variables 
Granting of pediatric exclusivity 
Using the date of pediatric granting data from the FDA list we generate 
dummy variables for the following  
a. Pediatric exclusivity ever granted 
(1/0) variable that Takes the value 1 if the drug is granted pediatric 
exclusivity before Dec 31, 2009.  
b. Pediatric exclusivity granted during the year – (1/0) variable that takes 
the value 1 if pediatric exclusivity was granted during the year.  
c. Pediatric exclusivity already granted  - (1/0 variable that takes the 
value 1 if pediatric exclusivity has been granted during the year or 
was granted in a previous year 
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Annual sales for each drug 
The Household component of the MEPS provides overall medical 
expenditure data, for each medical event. Each prescription event for each 
patient has a drug assigned. Each patient has a separate id, and each patient’s 
age is identified. Each patient has a personal sampling weight that represents the 
prevalence for their particular conditions in the population.   
We use the following variables: 
 
a. Total annual sales for each drug to adult patients – The weighted sum 
of the total expenditure per event for all patients aged 18 or over 
for each drug for the year  
b. Total annual sales for each drug to minor patients - The weighted sum 
of the total expenditure per event for all patients aged below 18 for 
each drug for the year  
c. Total annual sales for each drug - The weighted sum of the total 
expenditure per prescription event for all patients for each drug for 
the year  
Time to expiry 
The firm that owns the rights to the drug is more likely to seek pediatric 
exclusivity nearer the end of expiry of current exclusivity. This is due to the 






increased certainty in the sales that will be obtained in the “extra” 6 months at 
the end of the normal patent-protected period.  
We define time to expiry as the number of years until the final expiry of 
the drug. This variable has some noise in the data, as the expiry date at the 
time of granting pediatric exclusivity is not always available.  
 
Control variables 
We control for several factors, such as a large fraction of prescriptions being 
written for minor patients, which would make some pediatric trials desirable to 
address the large market of minors. Firms would be more likely to seek pediatric 
exclusivity for trials that they are likely to perform anyway.  
Therefore we control for:  
 
1. Fraction of annual prescriptions to minor patients 
The total prescriptions to minor patients for each drug for the year divided by 
total prescriptions to all patients for each drug for the year.  
 
2. Fraction of annual sales to minor patients 
The total sales to minor patients for each drug for the year divided by total 
sales to all patients for each drug for the year.  







Age of drug 
The older the drug, the more likely that the drug already has a safe off-
label use among minors and that non-clinical trial information is available to 
doctors. It is possible that these drugs are low-profit as newer drugs have 
already superseded them for many purposes. This would reduce the 
incentive provided by the pediatric exclusivity provision. It is also possible 
that these drugs are nearer expiry, which would increase the attention being 
incentive provided by the pediatric exclusivity provision. The firm owning 
the rights to the drug would also be likely to focus on immediate results from 
extensions. The effect of age could therefore be in either direction, and we 
control for it, in our analyses. 
We use the number of years since the drug was first approved by the 
FDA. This is left-censored by the orangebook at 1982, so all drugs first 
approved before January 1, 1982, are assumed to be approved on January 1, 
1982. 
 
Number of years under pediatric exclusivity regime 
As the drug could not have been approved before 1997, this is defined as 
the number of years since 1997 that the drug has been approved by the FDA 








 Drug sales have increased steadily with time.  Further, as time has passed 
since 1997, there has been more time to conduct studies and obtain pediatric 




In order to estimate the effects of variables on the drug obtaining pediatric 
exclusivity, we use a panel data logistic regression model  
Yit = βXit + it 
Where Y is a dummy variable indicating whether the ‘i’th pharmaceutical had 
received pediatric exclusivity at time ‘t’  
And Xit is a series of independent and control variables  
And where β is estimated using a panel logit regression where standard errors   
it are allowed to cluster around the ‘i’th drug.  
We also estimate the obtaining of pediatric exclusivity using a hazard rate 
model (Tuma and Hannan 1984).  The hazard rate (h(t)) is defined as follows: 
 
h(t) =   lim P[Obtaining exclusivity between t and t+ Δt| No exclusivity at t] 






 ∆t0     ∆t 
where P(.) is the probability of  a drug obtaining pediatric exclusivity during 
time period  at time[t, t+Δt] conditional on not having obtained pediatric 
exclusivity at time ‘t’. We follow Barron et al. (1994) and specify a piece-wise 
exponential model which allows us to model age dependence without making 
strong assumptions regarding its functional form.  As it was not possible to 
obtain pediatric exclusivity before 1997, we use time under the pediatric 
exclusivity regime as our age variable.  
 
Results:  
Descriptive Tables: Table 1 describes the key variables in our data, and table 
2 presents the correlation matrix. Annual prescriptions and sales are highly 
correlated and the fraction of sales to minors and fraction of prescriptions to 
minors are even more so. Tables 3 to 6 break down annual total and mean (per 
drug) sales and prescriptions by drugs having obtained pediatric exclusivity and 
by the patients who they are sold to- adults or minors.  It quickly becomes 
apparent that the mean sales of a drug that has obtained pediatric exclusivity is 
much higher than of one that hasn’t. For example, in 2006 the mean sales of a 
drug with pediatric exclusivity is just over US$ 670 million, whereas that of a 






drug without pediatric exclusivity is just under US$ 200 million.  A similar 
pattern can be seen in the total number of prescriptions. 
  
However, it must be appreciated that it takes time to correspond with the 
FDA regarding written requests, agree on trials to be conducted, and conduct the 
clinical trials. If H1 is correct, companies that commence the process may well be 
doing so on the anticipation of future sales. Further, since pediatric exclusivity 
adds to the end of the current period, there is no compelling reason to obtain 
exclusivity urgently, other than the possibility of the pediatric exclusivity 
provision not being renewed. (It has so far been renewed for 5 year intervals 
under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act 2002 and again in 2007 (@). 
As a result, in the earlier years of the pediatric exclusivity regime, the data 
showing higher mean sales is not as compelling- in fact in 1998 and 1999, the 
mean sales and prescriptions are lower for drugs with pediatric exclusivity than 
for drugs without them. (Table 4 and 6) 
In tables 7-10 we describe data where we have back-coded future 
obtaining of pediatric exclusivity. Thus the data are now split by drugs that have 
ever received pediatric exclusivity. This allows us to see differences in sales and 
prescriptions of drugs that had not at the time obtained pediatric exclusivity, but 
would do so later. The difference in sales increases most for earlier data, but even 






in our 2006 example above, the mean sales of drugs that would obtain pediatric 
exclusivity before 2010 is now US$ 688 million, and those that had not yet done 
so is US$ 146 million.  These data clearly indicate that H1 is likely to be 
supported.  
 
The ADHD Trio - outliers 
The data in Tables 3-10 also show some preliminary evidence of support 
for H2a and b.   The fraction of sales and prescriptions to minors appears to be 
slightly higher for drugs that have obtained pediatric exclusivity. These results, 
however, are strongly driven by three outliers, Adderall, Concerta and Strattera. 
Three drugs are approved to treat Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, 
(ADHD) and for all three drugs, over 2/3rds of their prescriptions and sales are 
to minors. Table 11 summarizes the data for the ADHD trio. After dropping 
these outliers, we repeat tables 3 through 10 as tables 12 through 19. These 
outliers are also dropped in all the t-statistics and regression tables.  
We see that the differences in fractions of prescriptions and sales to 
minors are considerable attenuated in tables 12 through 19. We test the difference 
in fractions of prescriptions and sales of drugs with and without pediatric 
exclusivity in Table 20. We find very limited support for hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
Obtaining pediatric exclusivity does not seem to increase or decrease the fraction 






of sales or prescriptions to minors. Contrary to H2a and H2b, drugs that obtained 
pediatric exclusivity before 2010 have a statistically significantly lower fraction of 
prescriptions and sales than drugs that did not obtain pediatric exclusivity. This 
supports the Boots et al. (2007) criticism that pediatric exclusivity has been 
obtained by drug companies on drugs that are primarily prescribed to (Boots, 
Sukhai et al. 2007)s. It could be argued that it is possible that that these drugs 
have been by and large, found to be unsuitable for minors thanks to the pediatric 
exclusivity testing. The final set of comparisons in Table 20, however, refute this 
possible explanation, showing that, within the set of drugs  that obtained 
pediatric exclusivity, there was an increase in prescriptions and sales to minor 
patients after pediatric exclusivity was obtained.  
 
To test all our hypotheses, we used panel-data logit regressions(Tables 21-
24 as well as  survival-time regressions (Tables 25 and 26). Since annual sales of 
drugs has a distribution with high skewness(6.94) and kurtosis (80.85), we opted 
to split the variable into deciles, the split points being shown in Table 20.  We 
find very strong support for H1 across all the regressions. The panel-data 
regressions (Tables 21-24) show an increased probability of a drug obtaining 
pediatric exclusivity if its annual sales are in excess of $33mn, with a sharply 
increased probability if the drugs’ annual sales are in excess of $260mn. 






Although the decision to obtain pediatric exclusivity is not strongly affected by 
timing, since the exclusivity is obtained only at the end of the time to expiry, the 
survival-time regressions show that a drug having annual sales in excess of 
$260mn is, statistically significantly, over 20 times more likely to obtain pediatric 
exclusivity than one with annual sales below $3.3mn.  
 
The regressions show no support for H2a or H2b, with coefficients on all 
the relevant fully-specified regressions: 21.2, 22.7, 24.6 or 28.4 for H2a ,  or 21.3, 
23.7 and 29.4 for H2b being insignificantly different from zero.  
 
The survival-time regressions (25.4) and (26.4) show no support for H3 
either, and neither do any of the panel-data regressions.  This may also be due to 
a limitation in our data- we have the information for the current protection 
expiry dates, including all exclusivities and extensions and patents, not the 
expiry of protection at the time that pediatric exclusivity was obtained, or to be 
completely accurate, at the time the decision to obtain exclusivity was taken. 
 
To recap, we find strong support for hypothesis H1, but no support for 
hypotheses H2a, H2b, or H3.  
 






Discussion and Conclusion 
It appears from our results that obtaining pediatric exclusivity is driven 
primarily, if not solely, by the total sales of the drug, especially once it’s beyond a 
certain threshold. In our analyses, we found this to be about $260 mn in annual 
sales.  We can compare this to the cost of a trial in Li, Eisenstein et al’s (2007) 
research. They estimated that the cost of a pediatric drug trial to comply with the 
exclusivity provisions ranged from $5-$43 million (median $12.5 million). Since, 
after patent expiry, generic product prices stabilize at about 30% of the brand-
name product (Saha, Grabowski et al. 2006) we can conclude that at least a 70% 
net contribution margin exists.  Under this assumption, to recover the median 
$12.5 million would require additional sales of merely $18 million in the 6 
months.  At first glance, our threshold of $260 mn appears to be very high, and 
might be interpreted as reluctance of firms to conduct pediatric exclusivity trials 
unless sales are already high. However since pediatric exclusivity applies at the 
end of the current patent protections, the additional provisions are being added 
on several years (in some cases over 10 years) in the future , the discounting 
required for future income is likely to explain a lot of this difference. A LEXIS-
NEXIS and FDA.gov search for a representative sample of the drugs that had at 
least one year of annual sales over $300 mn but never obtained pediatric 
exclusivity showed either a) their patents had been invalidated or b) they had 






reached a generic agreement due to lawsuits or c) their patents were being 
legally challenged or d) their current protections had not yet expired, and they 
still had the opportunity to gain pediatric exclusivity.  
 
Prior research (Li, Eisenstein et al. 2007) has focused on potential returns 
on investment for the firms. It is not simple, however, to interpret a firm’s 
returns on investment on pediatric trials from a regulatory policy perspective. A 
lower return on investment can be interpreted as a firm viewing pediatric 
exclusivity trials as a low-risk investment. With a lower threshold of sales 
required, more drugs might obtain exclusivity. This may be desirable from the 
objective of increasing pediatric trials but would increase total cost to the adult 
consumer, who does not benefit in any way from the tests.  The quality of the 
information obtained from the clinical trials is the key to balancing this decision. 
Higher quality trials may involve higher risks (e.g. with larger number of 
patients, greater chance of something going wrong) and costs and the sponsoring 
firm might require a higher return on investment.  
 
One of the outstanding issues regarding pediatric exclusivity is the actual 
cost to the consumer of the legislation. Since this cost is highly diffused and paid 
by no one consumer or group, there has been little focus on it. Using our data, we 






can make a first estimate of the cost.  If we accept the findings of Saha et al. 
(2006), the price of generics stabilizes at about 30% of the brand-name drug and 
at about 80% of the market within two years of entry.  Six months delay in 
generic entry implies a premium of 28% of annual sales of the drug at the time of 
the extended exclusivity14. While this cannot be calculated easily for drugs with 
unknown future projected sales and prices, or brought to a net present value at 
different expiry times (and no doubt discount rates) from Table 7, we can see a 
figure of $76 billion in sales for drugs that obtained pediatric exclusivity in 2010. 
A very conservative the estimated excess bill to consumers is 28% of that, i.e. 
approximately US$ 21 billion in undiscounted dollars at current sales rates. This 
figure does not include growth in sales, nor does it include all the drugs that 
have been approved since then.  
 
It is clear from our inability to find any support for hypotheses 2a and 2b, 
that the drugs being selected for pediatric exclusivity (with the exception of the 
ADHD outliers) are not those that have significant pediatric use, but rather have 
similar or lower pediatric use (see first set of comparisons in Table 20) than the 
general set of drugs.  
 
                                                 
14
 80% market share * 70% price difference * 0.5 years = 28% of annual sales 






 The above findings are not at all consistent with Pigou’s (1938) economic 
welfare idea that regulation is about maximizing social welfare, even if there is 
information asymmetry. Pediatric exclusivity has been renewed in 2002 and 
2007, even after data has been collected on which drugs it has been obtained for, 
their sales, and the pediatric benefits. It is far more consistent with the idea that 
there has been regulatory capture by a small powerful group of brand-name 
drug manufacturers to extend their monopoly protections by erecting barriers to 
entry to generic competitors, with a diffuse set of consumers to shoulder the$ 21 
bn cost. (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Dal Bó 2006) 
 
Our study has several limitations. We only have partial data as to which 
drugs were studied at the initial request of the FDA and which were studied at 
the initial request of the firms. This would enable more precise information as to 
the motivation of the firms. We do not have data where the FDA has issued 
Written Requests and the responses to the Written Requests are pending. We 
have very limited data on the length of time firms spent responding and 
negotiating with the FDA on the studies to be conducted. These would serve to 
differentiate drugs into categories which could be studied separately. We have 
no data on future sales projection data of firms or their cost of capital which they 
would take into consideration in their cost-benefit calculations. Although a 






paucity of researchers skilled in pediatric trials has been stated as a constraint 
(Caldwell, Murphy et al. 2004), we do not have any information as to how 
precisely this affects a single firm’s decision to conduct trials for pediatric 
exclusivity.   
 
 






Table 1 Data description 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Annual sales ($ million) 235.85 530.0 0 9,562.9 
Annual prescriptions 
(millions) 
2.63 5.80 0 84.61 
Fraction of sales to minors 
(%) 
8.34% 19.1% 0 1 
Fraction of prescriptions to 
minors (%) 
8.48% 19.1% 0 100% 
Age of drug (years) 7.74 6.00 0 25 
Time under pediatric 
exclusivity regime (years) 
4.42 2.97 0 10 
 

























-0.0619 -0.0608    
Fraction of 
prescriptions 
to minors (%) 
-0.0603 -0.0577 0.9852   
Age of drug 
(years) 





0.1442 0.0916 0.0054 0.0071 0.5826 
 






Table 3: Total sales of drugs with and without pediatric exclusivity 


























Total sales of 
drugs – USD 
millions 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 930.73 24,057.03 24,987.76 - - - 
 3.72% 96.28% 100.00%    
1997 1,425.62 27,991.18 29,416.80 - - - 
 4.85% 95.15% 100.00%    
1998 1,675.32 34,199.88 35,875.20 7.02 64.49 71.52 
 4.67% 95.33% 100.00% 9.82% 90.18% 100.00% 
1999 1,963.75 41,746.75 43,710.49 37.59 297.39 334.97 
 4.49% 95.51% 100.00% 11.22% 88.78% 100.00% 
2000 2,297.66 41,746.33 44,043.99 468.27 6,447.42 6,915.69 
 5.22% 94.78% 100.00% 6.77% 93.23% 100.00% 
2001 2,548.01 50,148.75 52,696.75 791.35 10,977.62 11,768.97 
 4.84% 95.16% 100.00% 6.72% 93.28% 100.00% 
2002 2,433.57 43,337.65 45,771.22 1,312.10 26,401.90 27,713.99 
 5.32% 94.68% 100.00% 4.73% 95.27% 100.00% 
2003 2,705.62 49,967.41 52,673.04 2,286.39 29,384.31 31,670.69 
 5.14% 94.86% 100.00% 7.22% 92.78% 100.00% 
2004 2,357.96 53,743.49 56,101.45 2,944.34 36,400.28 39,344.61 
 4.20% 95.80% 100.00% 7.48% 92.52% 100.00% 
2005 3,423.62 65,632.89 69,056.51 3,621.32 44,085.43 47,706.75 
 4.96% 95.04% 100.00% 7.59% 92.41% 100.00% 
2006 3,680.18 62,550.04 66,230.22 4,143.68 45,477.41 49,621.09 
 5.56% 94.44% 100.00% 8.35% 91.65% 100.00% 
2007 2,382.67 73,272.96 75,655.63 4,622.91 50,832.16 55,455.08 
 3.15% 96.85% 100.00% 8.34% 91.66% 100.00% 
 






Table 4: Mean sales of drugs with and without pediatric exclusivity 





























per drug – 
USD 
millions 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 5.85 151.30 157.16 - - - 
 3.72% 96.28% 100.00%    
1997 7.02 137.89 144.91 - - - 
 4.85% 95.15% 100.00%    
1998 7.32 149.34 156.66 7.02 64.49 71.52 
 4.67% 95.33% 100.00% 9.82% 90.18% 100.00% 
1999 7.98 169.70 177.68 9.40 74.35 83.74 
 4.49% 95.51% 100.00% 11.22% 88.78% 100.00% 
2000 8.29 150.71 159.00 46.83 644.74 691.57 
 5.22% 94.78% 100.00% 6.77% 93.23% 100.00% 
2001 9.23 181.70 190.93 37.68 522.74 560.43 
 4.84% 95.16% 100.00% 6.72% 93.28% 100.00% 
2002 8.42 149.96 158.38 39.76 800.06 839.82 
 5.32% 94.68% 100.00% 4.73% 95.27% 100.00% 
2003 9.02 166.56 175.58 48.65 625.20 673.84 
 5.14% 94.86% 100.00% 7.22% 92.78% 100.00% 
2004 7.58 172.81 180.39 49.90 616.95 666.86 
 4.20% 95.80% 100.00% 7.48% 92.52% 100.00% 
2005 10.41 199.49 209.90 54.87 667.96 722.83 
 4.96% 95.04% 100.00% 7.59% 92.41% 100.00% 
2006 11.08 188.40 199.49 56.00 614.56 670.56 
 5.56% 94.44% 100.00% 8.35% 91.65% 100.00% 
2007 7.20 221.37 228.57 55.03 605.14 660.18 
 3.15% 96.85% 100.00% 8.34% 91.66% 100.00% 
 






Table 5: Total prescriptions of drugs with and without pediatric exclusivity 
 Without pediatric exclusivity 


























 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 19.10 407.00 426.10 - - - 
 4.48% 95.52% 100.00%    
1997 25.80 447.00 472.80 - - - 
 5.46% 94.54% 100.00%    
1998 31.60 535.00 566.60 0.60 4.38 4.98 
 5.58% 94.42% 100.00% 12.01% 87.99% 100.00% 
1999 37.00 596.00 633.00 0.80 6.85 7.65 
 5.85% 94.15% 100.00% 10.44% 89.56% 100.00% 
2000 33.20 589.00 622.20 7.59 82.20 89.79 
 5.34% 94.66% 100.00% 8.45% 91.55% 100.00% 
2001 38.20 648.00 686.20 10.90 133.00 143.90 
 5.57% 94.43% 100.00% 7.57% 92.43% 100.00% 
2002 34.10 561.00 595.10 18.50 294.00 312.50 
 5.73% 94.27% 100.00% 5.92% 94.08% 100.00% 
2003 31.70 507.00 538.70 28.80 319.00 347.80 
 5.88% 94.12% 100.00% 8.28% 91.72% 100.00% 
2004 30.20 565.00 595.20 34.80 378.00 412.80 
 5.07% 94.93% 100.00% 8.43% 91.57% 100.00% 
2005 33.00 622.00 655.00 40.10 446.00 486.10 
 5.04% 94.96% 100.00% 8.25% 91.75% 100.00% 
2006 32.10 553.00 585.10 42.60 484.00 526.60 
 5.49% 94.51% 100.00% 8.09% 91.91% 100.00% 
2007 19.30 502.00 521.30 36.90 422.00 458.90 
 3.70% 96.30% 100.00% 8.04% 91.96% 100.00% 
 






Table 6: Mean prescriptions of drugs with and without pediatric exclusivity 
 Without pediatric exclusivity 

































 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 0.12 2.56 2.68 - - - 
 4.47% 95.53% 100.00%    
1997 0.13 2.20 2.33 - - - 
 5.47% 94.53% 100.00%    
1998 0.14 2.34 2.47 0.60 4.38 4.98 
 5.59% 94.41% 100.00% 12.01% 87.99% 100.00% 
1999 0.15 2.42 2.57 0.20 1.71 1.91 
 5.84% 94.16% 100.00% 10.44% 89.56% 100.00% 
2000 0.12 2.13 2.25 0.76 8.22 8.98 
 5.33% 94.67% 100.00% 8.45% 91.55% 100.00% 
2001 0.14 2.35 2.49 0.52 6.35 6.86 
 5.57% 94.43% 100.00% 7.53% 92.47% 100.00% 
2002 0.12 1.94 2.06 0.56 8.91 9.47 
 5.73% 94.27% 100.00% 5.92% 94.08% 100.00% 
2003 0.11 1.69 1.80 0.61 6.79 7.40 
 5.87% 94.13% 100.00% 8.27% 91.73% 100.00% 
2004 0.10 1.82 1.91 0.59 6.40 6.99 
 5.08% 94.92% 100.00% 8.45% 91.55% 100.00% 
2005 0.10 1.89 1.99 0.61 6.76 7.36 
 5.04% 94.96% 100.00% 8.24% 91.76% 100.00% 
2006 0.10 1.67 1.76 0.58 6.53 7.11 
 5.49% 94.51% 100.00% 8.09% 91.91% 100.00% 
2007 0.06 1.52 1.58 0.44 5.03 5.47 
 3.70% 96.30% 100.00% 8.03% 91.97% 100.00% 
 
 








Table 7: Total sales of drugs granted and never granted pediatric exclusivity 
(before 2010)  
 No Pediatric exclusivity before 2010 Pediatric exclusivity before 2010 
Year 
Total sales for 







of drugs - 
millions 













 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 556.60 9,447.79 10,004.38 374.13 14,609.25 14,983.38 
 5.56% 94.44% 100.00% 2.50% 97.50% 100.00% 
1997 654.45 11,137.45 11,791.90 771.17 16,853.73 17,624.90 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 4.38% 95.62% 100.00% 
1998 735.61 13,234.92 13,970.53 946.74 21,029.44 21,976.18 
 5.27% 94.73% 100.00% 4.31% 95.69% 100.00% 
1999 877.08 16,799.78 17,676.86 1,124.25 25,244.35 26,368.60 
 4.96% 95.04% 100.00% 4.26% 95.74% 100.00% 
2000 1,208.52 15,081.17 16,289.69 1,557.41 33,112.58 34,669.99 
 7.42% 92.58% 100.00% 4.49% 95.51% 100.00% 
2001 945.56 18,434.72 19,380.29 2,393.79 42,691.64 45,085.43 
 4.88% 95.12% 100.00% 5.31% 94.69% 100.00% 
2002 1,080.31 21,528.98 22,609.28 2,665.37 48,210.57 50,875.93 
 4.78% 95.22% 100.00% 5.24% 94.76% 100.00% 
2003 1,549.32 26,368.78 27,918.10 3,442.69 52,982.94 56,425.63 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 6.10% 93.90% 100.00% 
2004 1,609.65 29,636.66 31,246.31 3,692.65 60,507.10 64,199.76 
 5.15% 94.85% 100.00% 5.75% 94.25% 100.00% 
2005 2,241.30 37,197.83 39,439.13 4,803.64 72,520.49 77,324.13 
 5.68% 94.32% 100.00% 6.21% 93.79% 100.00% 
2006 2,245.87 42,053.01 44,298.88 5,577.99 65,974.44 71,552.43 
 5.07% 94.93% 100.00% 7.80% 92.20% 100.00% 
2007 1,875.55 52,528.03 54,403.58 5,130.03 71,577.09 76,707.12 
 3.45% 96.55% 100.00% 6.69% 93.31% 100.00% 







Table 8 :  Mean sales of drugs granted and never granted pediatric exclusivity 
(before 2010)  
 Pediatric exclusivity not obtained before 2010 
Pediatric exclusivity obtained before 
2010 
Year 
Mean sales per 























 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 5.01 85.12 90.13 7.79 304.36 312.15 
 5.56% 94.44% 100.00% 2.50% 97.50% 100.00% 
1997 4.51 76.81 81.32 13.30 290.58 303.88 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 4.38% 95.62% 100.00% 
1998 4.51 81.20 85.71 14.13 313.87 328.00 
 5.27% 94.73% 100.00% 4.31% 95.69% 100.00% 
1999 4.93 94.38 99.31 15.61 350.62 366.23 
 4.96% 95.04% 100.00% 4.26% 95.74% 100.00% 
2000 5.98 74.66 80.64 18.32 389.56 407.88 
 7.42% 92.58% 100.00% 4.49% 95.51% 100.00% 
2001 4.57 89.06 93.62 26.60 474.35 500.95 
 4.88% 95.12% 100.00% 5.31% 94.69% 100.00% 
2002 4.74 94.43 99.16 28.35 512.88 541.23 
 4.78% 95.22% 100.00% 5.24% 94.76% 100.00% 
2003 6.32 107.63 113.95 33.75 519.44 553.19 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 6.10% 93.90% 100.00% 
2004 6.10 112.26 118.36 34.84 570.82 605.66 
 5.15% 94.85% 100.00% 5.75% 94.25% 100.00% 
2005 7.76 128.71 136.47 45.32 684.16 729.47 
 5.68% 94.32% 100.00% 6.21% 93.79% 100.00% 
2006 7.44 139.25 146.69 53.63 634.37 688.00 
 5.07% 94.93% 100.00% 7.80% 92.20% 100.00% 
2007 6.01 168.36 174.37 49.81 694.92 744.73 
 3.45% 96.55% 100.00% 6.69% 93.31% 100.00% 
 






Table 9: Total prescriptions of drugs granted and never granted pediatric 
exclusivity (before 2010)  
 Pediatric exclusivity not obtained before 2010 



























(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 11.70 213.00 224.70 7.36 194.00 201.36 
 5.21% 94.79% 100.00% 3.65% 96.35% 100.00% 
1997 13.30 223.00 236.30 12.60 224.00 236.60 
 5.63% 94.37% 100.00% 5.33% 94.67% 100.00% 
1998 15.20 261.00 276.20 17.00 278.00 295.00 
 5.50% 94.50% 100.00% 5.76% 94.24% 100.00% 
1999 19.10 276.00 295.10 18.70 327.00 345.70 
 6.47% 93.53% 100.00% 5.41% 94.59% 100.00% 
2000 16.20 269.00 285.20 24.50 402.00 426.50 
 5.68% 94.32% 100.00% 5.74% 94.26% 100.00% 
2001 17.80 294.00 311.80 31.20 487.00 518.20 
 5.71% 94.29% 100.00% 6.02% 93.98% 100.00% 
2002 17.40 305.00 322.40 35.20 550.00 585.20 
 5.40% 94.60% 100.00% 6.02% 93.98% 100.00% 
2003 21.90 291.00 312.90 38.60 536.00 574.60 
 7.00% 93.00% 100.00% 6.72% 93.28% 100.00% 
2004 23.70 330.00 353.70 41.40 612.00 653.40 
 6.70% 93.30% 100.00% 6.34% 93.66% 100.00% 
2005 26.00 370.00 396.00 47.10 699.00 746.10 
 6.57% 93.43% 100.00% 6.31% 93.69% 100.00% 
2006 24.80 379.00 403.80 49.90 658.00 707.90 
 6.14% 93.86% 100.00% 7.05% 92.95% 100.00% 
2007 16.40 378.00 394.40 39.70 546.00 585.70 
 4.16% 95.84% 100.00% 6.78% 93.22% 100.00% 
 






Table 10:  Mean prescriptions of drugs granted and never granted pediatric 
exclusivity (before 2010)  
 
Pediatric exclusivity not obtained 






























drug – millions 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 0.11 1.91 2.02 0.15 4.05 4.20 
 5.22% 94.78% 100.00% 3.64% 96.36% 100.00% 
1997 0.09 1.54 1.63 0.22 3.87 4.08 
 5.63% 94.37% 100.00% 5.31% 94.69% 100.00% 
1998 0.09 1.60 1.69 0.25 4.16 4.41 
 5.52% 94.48% 100.00% 5.76% 94.24% 100.00% 
1999 0.11 1.55 1.66 0.26 4.54 4.80 
 6.48% 93.52% 100.00% 5.40% 94.60% 100.00% 
2000 0.08 1.33 1.41 0.29 4.73 5.02 
 5.69% 94.31% 100.00% 5.75% 94.25% 100.00% 
2001 0.09 1.42 1.51 0.35 5.41 5.76 
 5.72% 94.28% 100.00% 6.02% 93.98% 100.00% 
2002 0.08 1.34 1.41 0.37 5.85 6.22 
 5.39% 94.61% 100.00% 6.02% 93.98% 100.00% 
2003 0.09 1.19 1.28 0.38 5.26 5.63 
 6.99% 93.01% 100.00% 6.72% 93.28% 100.00% 
2004 0.09 1.25 1.34 0.39 5.77 6.17 
 6.69% 93.31% 100.00% 6.33% 93.67% 100.00% 
2005 0.09 1.28 1.37 0.44 6.59 7.03 
 6.57% 93.43% 100.00% 6.32% 93.68% 100.00% 
2006 0.08 1.26 1.34 0.48 6.32 6.80 
 6.15% 93.85% 100.00% 7.05% 92.95% 100.00% 
2007 0.05 1.21 1.27 0.39 5.30 5.69 
 4.17% 95.83% 100.00% 6.78% 93.22% 100.00% 
 







Table 11: The three outliers – The ADHD trio of Adderall, Concerta and 
Strattat 
Name Adderall Concerta Strattera 
Approval year 1996 2000 2002 
Pediatric exclusivity granted 2004 2003 2001 
    
Total sales to minors ($mn) 3,131.52 3,285.54 1,367.83 
Fraction of sales to minors 67.4% 80.3% 67.9% 
Total sales (1996-2007) 4,647.85 4,092.48 2,015.41 
Mean annual sales to minors ($mn) 260.96 410.69 273.57 
Mean annual sales 387.32 511.56 403.08 
    
Total prescriptions to minors (mn) 42.70 33.30 12.60 
Fraction of prescriptions to minors 71.6% 81.0% 67.4% 
Total prescriptions (mn) 59.60 41.10 18.70 
    
Mean annual prescriptions to minors 3.56 4.17 2.52 
Mean annual prescriptions 4.96 5.14 3.74 
 






Table 12:  Sales of drugs with and without pediatric exclusivity excluding the 
ADHD Trio 




























Total sales of 
drugs – USD 
millions 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 556.599 9447.785 10004.38 0 0 0 
 5.56% 94.44% 100.00%    
1997 654.451 11137.45 11791.9 0 0 0 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00%    
1998 735.609 13234.92 13970.53 7.024 64.492 71.516 
 5.27% 94.73% 100.00% 9.82% 90.18% 100.00% 
1999 877.081 16799.78 17676.86 37.586 297.388 334.974 
 4.96% 95.04% 100.00% 11.22% 88.78% 100.00% 
2000 1208.522 15081.17 16289.69 468.27 6447.422 6915.692 
 7.42% 92.58% 100.00% 6.77% 93.23% 100.00% 
2001 945.563 18434.72 19380.29 791.346 10977.62 11768.97 
 4.88% 95.12% 100.00% 6.72% 93.28% 100.00% 
2002 1080.305 21528.98 22609.28 1312.097 26401.9 27713.99 
 4.78% 95.22% 100.00% 4.73% 95.27% 100.00% 
2003 1549.319 26368.78 27918.1 1739.572 29231.38 30970.95 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 5.62% 94.38% 100.00% 
2004 1609.647 29636.66 31246.31 1771.84 35893.44 37665.28 
 5.15% 94.85% 100.00% 4.70% 95.30% 100.00% 
2005 2241.3 37197.83 39439.13 2371.252 43569.05 45940.3 
 5.68% 94.32% 100.00% 5.16% 94.84% 100.00% 
2006 2245.874 42053.01 44298.88 2734.467 44905.59 47640.06 
 5.07% 94.93% 100.00% 5.74% 94.26% 100.00% 
2007 1875.553 52528.03 54403.58 3053.445 50104.13 53157.58 
 3.45% 96.55% 100.00% 5.74% 94.26% 100.00% 
 
 






Table 13: Mean annual sales of drugs, with and without pediatric exclusivity, 
excluding the ADHD Trio 

































 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 5.014405 85.11518 90.12959 0 0 0 
 5.56% 94.44% 100.00%    
1997 4.513455 76.81001 81.32347 0 0 0 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00%    
1998 4.512939 81.19586 85.70879 7.024 64.492 71.516 
 5.27% 94.73% 100.00% 9.82% 90.18% 100.00% 
1999 4.927421 94.38081 99.30823 9.3965 74.347 83.7435 
 4.96% 95.04% 100.00% 11.22% 88.78% 100.00% 
2000 5.982782 74.65924 80.64202 46.827 644.7422 691.5692 
 7.42% 92.58% 100.00% 6.77% 93.23% 100.00% 
2001 4.567937 89.05663 93.62457 37.68314 522.7438 560.4269 
 4.88% 95.12% 100.00% 6.72% 93.28% 100.00% 
2002 4.73818 94.42534 99.16352 39.76052 800.0574 839.8179 
 4.78% 95.22% 100.00% 4.73% 95.27% 100.00% 
2003 6.323751 107.6277 113.9514 38.65716 649.5862 688.2433 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 5.62% 94.38% 100.00% 
2004 6.097148 112.2601 118.3572 31.64 640.9544 672.5944 
 5.15% 94.85% 100.00% 4.70% 95.30% 100.00% 
2005 7.755363 128.7122 136.4676 37.63892 691.5722 729.2111 
 5.68% 94.32% 100.00% 5.16% 94.84% 100.00% 
2006 7.436669 139.2484 146.685 38.51362 632.4731 670.9867 
 5.07% 94.93% 100.00% 5.74% 94.26% 100.00% 
2007 6.011388 168.3591 174.3705 37.69685 618.5696 656.2664 
 3.45% 96.55% 100.00% 5.74% 94.26% 100.00% 
 






Table 14 : Total prescriptions with and without pediatric exclusivity excluding 
the ADHD Trio 

























– millions  
 (%)   (%)   (%)   (%)   (%)   (%)  
11.70 213.00 224.00 - - - 
937.09% 5.49% 100.00%    
13.30 223.00 236.00 - - - 
895.52% 5.96% 100.00%    
15.20 261.00 276.00 0.60 4.38 4.98 
5.51% 94.57% 100.00% 12.01% 87.99% 100.00% 
19.10 276.00 295.00 0.80 6.85 7.65 
6.47% 93.56% 100.00% 10.44% 89.56% 100.00% 
16.20 269.00 285.00 7.59 82.20 89.80 
5.68% 94.39% 100.00% 8.45% 91.54% 100.00% 
17.80 294.00 312.00 10.90 133.00 144.00 
5.71% 94.23% 100.00% 7.57% 92.36% 100.00% 
17.40 305.00 322.00 18.50 294.00 313.00 
5.40% 94.72% 100.00% 5.91% 93.93% 100.00% 
21.90 291.00 312.00 22.00 318.00 340.00 
7.02% 93.27% 100.00% 6.47% 93.53% 100.00% 
23.70 330.00 354.00 22.60 373.00 395.00 
6.69% 93.22% 100.00% 5.72% 94.43% 100.00% 
26.00 370.00 396.00 27.70 441.00 468.00 
6.57% 93.43% 100.00% 5.92% 94.23% 100.00% 
24.80 379.00 404.00 29.40 477.00 506.00 
6.14% 93.81% 100.00% 5.81% 94.27% 100.00% 
16.40 378.00 395.00 24.00 416.00 440.00 
4.15% 95.70% 100.00% 5.45% 94.55% 100.00% 
 
 






Table 15: Mean annual prescriptions with and without pediatric exclusivity 
excluding the ADHD Trio 



































 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 0.11 1.91 2.02 - - - 
 5.22% 94.78% 100.00%    
1997 0.09 1.54 1.63 - - - 
 5.63% 94.37% 100.00%    
1998 0.09 1.60 1.69 0.60 4.38 4.98 
 5.52% 94.48% 100.00% 12.01% 87.99% 100.00% 
1999 0.11 1.55 1.66 0.20 1.71 1.91 
 6.48% 93.52% 100.00% 10.44% 89.56% 100.00% 
2000 0.08 1.33 1.41 0.76 8.22 8.98 
 5.69% 94.31% 100.00% 8.45% 91.55% 100.00% 
2001 0.09 1.42 1.51 0.52 6.35 6.86 
 5.72% 94.28% 100.00% 7.53% 92.47% 100.00% 
2002 0.08 1.34 1.41 0.56 8.91 9.47 
 5.39% 94.61% 100.00% 5.92% 94.08% 100.00% 
2003 0.09 1.19 1.28 0.49 7.06 7.55 
 6.99% 93.01% 100.00% 6.48% 93.52% 100.00% 
2004 0.09 1.25 1.34 0.40 6.65 7.06 
 6.69% 93.31% 100.00% 5.73% 94.27% 100.00% 
2005 0.09 1.28 1.37 0.44 6.99 7.43 
 6.57% 93.43% 100.00% 5.91% 94.09% 100.00% 
2006 0.08 1.26 1.34 0.41 6.72 7.13 
 6.15% 93.85% 100.00% 5.80% 94.20% 100.00% 
2007 0.05 1.21 1.27 0.30 5.14 5.43 
 4.17% 95.83% 100.00% 5.46% 94.54% 100.00% 
 






Table 16:  Total sales of drugs granted and never granted pediatric exclusivity 
(before 2010) excluding the ADHD Trio 
 
Pediatric exclusivity not obtained before 
2010 




























 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 556.60 9,447.79 10,004.38 372.17 14,609.25 14,981.42 
 5.56% 94.44% 100.00% 2.48% 97.52% 100.00% 
1997 653.68 11,137.05 11,790.72 745.88 16,850.55 17,596.42 
 5.54% 94.46% 100.00% 4.24% 95.76% 100.00% 
1998 735.61 13,234.92 13,970.53 886.33 21,024.64 21,910.97 
 5.27% 94.73% 100.00% 4.05% 95.95% 100.00% 
1999 861.55 16,799.19 17,660.74 1,008.02 25,225.22 26,233.24 
 4.88% 95.12% 100.00% 3.84% 96.16% 100.00% 
2000 1,190.33 15,075.59 16,265.92 1,353.18 33,066.47 34,419.66 
 7.32% 92.68% 100.00% 3.93% 96.07% 100.00% 
2001 928.18 18,434.72 19,362.91 1,856.45 42,578.04 44,434.49 
 4.79% 95.21% 100.00% 4.18% 95.82% 100.00% 
2002 1,080.31 21,528.98 22,609.28 2,033.50 48,031.03 50,064.53 
 4.78% 95.22% 100.00% 4.06% 95.94% 100.00% 
2003 1,549.32 26,368.78 27,918.10 2,636.37 52,700.39 55,336.75 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 4.76% 95.24% 100.00% 
2004 1,609.65 29,636.66 31,246.31 2,520.16 60,000.27 62,520.43 
 5.15% 94.85% 100.00% 4.03% 95.97% 100.00% 
2005 2,241.30 37,197.83 39,439.13 3,553.57 72,004.11 75,557.68 
 5.68% 94.32% 100.00% 4.70% 95.30% 100.00% 
2006 2,245.87 42,053.01 44,298.88 4,168.77 65,402.62 69,571.39 
 5.07% 94.93% 100.00% 5.99% 94.01% 100.00% 
2007 1,875.55 52,528.03 54,403.58 3,560.56 70,849.06 74,409.63 
 3.45% 96.55% 100.00% 4.79% 95.21% 100.00% 






Table 17 :  Mean sales of drugs granted and never granted pediatric exclusivity 
(before 2010) excluding the ADHD Trio 
 
Pediatric exclusivity not obtained before 
2010 
Pediatric exclusivity obtained before 
2010 
Year 
Mean sales per 






















(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 5.01 85.12 90.13 7.92 310.84 318.75 
 5.56% 94.44% 100.00% 2.48% 97.52% 100.00% 
1997 4.57 77.88 82.45 13.32 300.90 314.22 
 5.54% 94.46% 100.00% 4.24% 95.76% 100.00% 
1998 4.51 81.20 85.71 13.43 318.56 331.98 
 5.27% 94.73% 100.00% 4.05% 95.95% 100.00% 
1999 4.87 94.91 99.78 14.20 355.28 369.48 
 4.88% 95.12% 100.00% 3.84% 96.16% 100.00% 
2000 5.92 75.00 80.92 16.30 398.39 414.69 
 7.32% 92.68% 100.00% 3.93% 96.07% 100.00% 
2001 4.51 89.49 93.99 21.10 483.84 504.94 
 4.79% 95.21% 100.00% 4.18% 95.82% 100.00% 
2002 4.74 94.43 99.16 22.10 522.08 544.18 
 4.78% 95.22% 100.00% 4.06% 95.94% 100.00% 
2003 6.32 107.63 113.95 26.63 532.33 558.96 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 4.76% 95.24% 100.00% 
2004 6.10 112.26 118.36 24.47 582.53 606.99 
 5.15% 94.85% 100.00% 4.03% 95.97% 100.00% 
2005 7.76 128.71 136.47 34.50 699.07 733.57 
 5.68% 94.32% 100.00% 4.70% 95.30% 100.00% 
2006 7.44 139.25 146.69 41.27 647.55 688.83 
 5.07% 94.93% 100.00% 5.99% 94.01% 100.00% 
2007 6.01 168.36 174.37 35.61 708.49 744.10 
 3.45% 96.55% 100.00% 4.79% 95.21% 100.00% 
1996 5.01 85.12 90.13 7.92 310.84 318.75 






Table 18: Total prescriptions of drugs granted and never granted pediatric 
exclusivity (before 2010) excluding the ADHD Trio 
 
Pediatric exclusivity not obtained before 
2010 




























(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1996 11.71 212.54 224.24 7.28 194.47 201.74 
 5.22% 94.78% 100.00% 3.61% 96.39% 100.00% 
1997 13.25 222.58 235.82 11.77 224.11 235.88 
 5.62% 94.38% 100.00% 4.99% 95.01% 100.00% 
1998 15.24 260.77 276.01 14.75 278.26 293.01 
 5.52% 94.48% 100.00% 5.03% 94.97% 100.00% 
1999 18.64 276.02 294.66 15.23 326.70 341.93 
 6.33% 93.67% 100.00% 4.45% 95.55% 100.00% 
2000 15.76 269.03 284.79 19.31 401.31 420.62 
 5.53% 94.47% 100.00% 4.59% 95.41% 100.00% 
2001 17.30 294.10 311.40 23.39 485.21 508.60 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 4.60% 95.40% 100.00% 
2002 17.37 304.97 322.33 26.82 547.58 574.40 
 5.39% 94.61% 100.00% 4.67% 95.33% 100.00% 
2003 21.85 290.59 312.45 28.58 533.34 561.91 
 6.99% 93.01% 100.00% 5.09% 94.91% 100.00% 
2004 23.68 330.35 354.03 29.18 607.17 636.35 
 6.69% 93.31% 100.00% 4.59% 95.41% 100.00% 
2005 25.98 369.55 395.52 34.75 693.34 728.09 
 6.57% 93.43% 100.00% 4.77% 95.23% 100.00% 
2006 24.84 379.07 403.91 36.67 651.30 687.96 
 6.15% 93.85% 100.00% 5.33% 94.67% 100.00% 
2007 16.45 378.42 394.87 26.87 539.96 566.83 
 4.17% 95.83% 100.00% 4.74% 95.26% 100.00% 
 






Table 19:  Mean prescriptions of drugs granted and never granted pediatric 
exclusivity (before 2010) excluding the ADHD Trio 
 
Pediatric exclusivity not obtained before 
2010 
































1996 0.11 1.91 2.02 0.15 4.14 4.29 
 5.22% 94.78% 100.00% 3.61% 96.39% 100.00% 
1997 0.09 1.56 1.65 0.21 4.00 4.21 
 5.62% 94.38% 100.00% 4.99% 95.01% 100.00% 
1998 0.09 1.60 1.69 0.22 4.22 4.44 
 5.52% 94.48% 100.00% 5.03% 94.97% 100.00% 
1999 0.11 1.56 1.66 0.21 4.60 4.82 
 6.33% 93.67% 100.00% 4.45% 95.55% 100.00% 
2000 0.08 1.34 1.42 0.23 4.84 5.07 
 5.53% 94.47% 100.00% 4.59% 95.41% 100.00% 
2001 0.08 1.43 1.51 0.27 5.51 5.78 
 5.55% 94.45% 100.00% 4.60% 95.40% 100.00% 
2002 0.08 1.34 1.41 0.29 5.95 6.24 
 5.39% 94.61% 100.00% 4.67% 95.33% 100.00% 
2003 0.09 1.19 1.28 0.29 5.39 5.68 
 6.99% 93.01% 100.00% 5.09% 94.91% 100.00% 
2004 0.09 1.25 1.34 0.28 5.89 6.18 
 6.69% 93.31% 100.00% 4.59% 95.41% 100.00% 
2005 0.09 1.28 1.37 0.34 6.73 7.07 
 6.57% 93.43% 100.00% 4.77% 95.23% 100.00% 
2006 0.08 1.26 1.34 0.36 6.45 6.81 
 6.15% 93.85% 100.00% 5.33% 94.67% 100.00% 
2007 0.05 1.21 1.27 0.27 5.40 5.67 
 4.17% 95.83% 100.00% 4.74% 95.26% 100.00% 
1996 0.11 1.91 2.02 0.15 4.14 4.29 






 Table 20: Annual Sales percentiles used in regressions (excluding ADHD trio) 
 



















Table 21: Factors that affect drugs ever obtaining pediatric exclusivity 
 
 (21.1) (21.2) (21.3) (21.4) 




 -0.119  -0.197 
 (0.816)  (3.319) 
Fraction of total 
sales to minors 
  -0.108 0.078 
  (0.794) (3.229) 
10% < Annual sales 
percentile < 25% 
0.342 0.341 0.340 0.341 
(0.537) (0.537) (0.538) (0.538) 
25% < Annual sales 
percentile < 30% 
0.571 0.567 0.567 0.567 
(0.555) (0.556) (0.556) (0.556) 
30% < Annual sales 
percentile < 40% 
0.861 0.857 0.858 0.857 
(0.553) (0.553) (0.553) (0.553) 
40% < Annual sales 
percentile<50% 
1.237* 1.232* 1.232* 1.232* 
(0.556) (0.557) (0.557) (0.557) 
50% < Annual sales 
percentile < 60% 
1.501** 1.495** 1.496** 1.495** 
(0.552) (0.553) (0.553) (0.553) 
60 %< Annual sales 
percentile < 70% 
1.689** 1.682** 1.683** 1.683** 
(0.558) (0.559) (0.560) (0.560) 
70% < Annual sales 
percentile < 80% 
2.374** 2.367** 2.368** 2.368** 
(0.565) (0.567) (0.567) (0.567) 
80% < Annual sales 
percentile<90% 
3.106** 3.100** 3.100** 3.100** 
(0.577) (0.579) (0.579) (0.579) 
Annual sales 
percentile>90% 
4.595** 4.587** 4.587** 4.587** 
(0.655) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) 
Constant 
-4.373** -4.361** -4.362** -4.361** 
(0.607) (0.612) (0.612) (0.612) 
Observations 3656 3654 3654 3654 
Number of Drugs 517 517 517 517 
All regressions include year fixed effects  
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     






Table 22: Factors affecting obtaining pediatric exclusivity 
 (22.1) (22.2) (22.3) (22.4) (22.5) (22.6) (22.7) 




 0.444 0.461 0.461 0.542 0.549 0.529 
 (0.793) (0.797) (0.797) (0.812) (0.815) (0.815) 
Age of drug 
  0.114** 0.114** 0.026  0.027 




    0.253** 0.297** 0.252** 
    (0.090) (0.059) (0.090) 
Time to expiry of 
exclusivity 
protections 
     0.004 0.007 
     (0.033) (0.034) 
10% < Annual sales 
percentile < 20% 
0.808 0.809 0.834 0.834 0.809 0.801 0.806 
(0.629) (0.634) (0.633) (0.633) (0.638) (0.638) (0.637) 
20% < Annual sales 
percentile < 30% 
0.111 0.129 0.070 0.070 0.043 0.041 0.043 
(0.695) (0.702) (0.711) (0.711) (0.716) (0.716) (0.716) 
30% < Annual sales 
percentile < 40% 
1.478* 1.495* 1.469* 1.469* 1.457* 1.456* 1.454* 
(0.626) (0.630) (0.633) (0.633) (0.638) (0.639) (0.638) 
40% < Annual sales 
percentile<50% 
1.335* 1.358* 1.347* 1.347* 1.299* 1.290* 1.296* 
(0.628) (0.635) (0.636) (0.636) (0.640) (0.640) (0.640) 
50% < Annual sales 
percentile < 60% 
1.509* 1.534* 1.484* 1.484* 1.417* 1.404* 1.410* 
(0.623) (0.629) (0.632) (0.632) (0.635) (0.636) (0.636) 
60 %< Annual sales 
percentile < 70% 
1.604* 1.638* 1.631* 1.631* 1.568* 1.552* 1.560* 
(0.646) (0.653) (0.653) (0.653) (0.659) (0.660) (0.660) 
70% < Annual sales 
percentile < 80% 
1.986** 2.021** 1.926** 1.926** 1.881** 1.875** 1.872** 
(0.626) (0.631) (0.635) (0.635) (0.640) (0.641) (0.641) 
80% < Annual sales 
percentile<90% 
2.860** 2.902** 2.885** 2.885** 2.852** 2.835** 2.841** 
(0.605) (0.611) (0.612) (0.612) (0.616) (0.618) (0.618) 
Annual sales 
percentile>90% 
4.179** 4.230** 4.311** 4.311** 4.318** 4.296** 4.309** 
(0.625) (0.633) (0.636) (0.636) (0.640) (0.642) (0.641) 
Constant 
-30.956 -31.006 -31.829 -31.829 -7.042** -31.002 -31.253 
(9,465) (9,390) (9,843) (9,843) (0.744) (9,813) (9,993) 
Observations 3656 3654 3654 3654 3654 3654 3654 
Number of Drugs 517 517 517 517 517 517 517 
All regressions include year fixed effects  
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     






Table 23: Factors affecting obtaining pediatric exclusivity 
 (23.1) (23.2) (23.3) (23.4) (23.5) (23.6) (23.7) 
Pediatric exclusivity granted (1/0) 
Fraction of sales to 
minors 
 0.506 0.529 0.529 0.594 0.599 0.583 
 (0.764) (0.768) (0.768) (0.782) (0.785) (0.784) 
Age of drug 
  0.114** 0.114** 0.026  0.028 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.042)  (0.043) 
Time under ped. 
exclusivity regime 
    0.253** 0.297** 0.252** 
    (0.090) (0.059) (0.090) 
Time to expiry of 
current protections 
     0.004 0.007 
     (0.033) (0.034) 
10% < Annual sales 
percentile < 20% 
0.808 0.813 0.838 0.838 0.813 0.805 0.810 
(0.629) (0.634) (0.634) (0.634) (0.638) (0.639) (0.638) 
20% < Annual sales 
percentile < 30% 
0.111 0.129 0.069 0.069 0.039 0.038 0.040 
(0.695) (0.702) (0.711) (0.711) (0.716) (0.716) (0.716) 
30% < Annual sales 
percentile < 40% 
1.478* 1.495* 1.469* 1.469* 1.457* 1.455* 1.454* 
(0.626) (0.631) (0.634) (0.634) (0.639) (0.639) (0.639) 
40% < Annual sales 
percentile<50% 
1.335* 1.362* 1.351* 1.351* 1.302* 1.293* 1.299* 
(0.628) (0.635) (0.637) (0.637) (0.640) (0.640) (0.640) 
50% < Annual sales 
percentile < 60% 
1.509* 1.536* 1.486* 1.486* 1.418* 1.405* 1.412* 
(0.623) (0.629) (0.632) (0.632) (0.635) (0.636) (0.636) 
60 %< Annual sales 
percentile < 70% 
1.604* 1.645* 1.639* 1.639* 1.576* 1.560* 1.568* 
(0.646) (0.653) (0.654) (0.654) (0.659) (0.661) (0.660) 
70% < Annual sales 
percentile < 80% 
1.986** 2.027** 1.931** 1.931** 1.886** 1.880** 1.878** 
(0.626) (0.632) (0.635) (0.635) (0.640) (0.641) (0.641) 
80% < Annual sales 
percentile<90% 
2.860** 2.907** 2.891** 2.891** 2.856** 2.840** 2.846** 
(0.605) (0.612) (0.612) (0.612) (0.616) (0.618) (0.618) 
Annual sales 
percentile>90% 
4.179** 4.235** 4.317** 4.317** 4.323** 4.302** 4.315** 
(0.625) (0.633) (0.636) (0.636) (0.641) (0.642) (0.641) 
Constant -30.956 -31.014 -31.840 -31.840 -7.051** -31.005 -31.259 
 (9,465) (9,415) (9,846) (9,846) (0.743) (9,817) (10,00) 
Observations 3656 3654 3654 3654 3654 3654 3654 
Number of Drugs 517 517 517 517 517 517 517 
All regressions include year fixed effects  
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
 






Table 24: Factors affecting the timing of obtaining pediatric exclusivity  
 (24.1) (24.2) (24.3) (24.4) (24.5) (24.6) 




 -0.476 -0.503 -0.488 -0.552 -0.555 
 (0.929) (0.934) (0.933) (0.945) (0.945) 
Age of drug 
  0.014 0.007 0.008 0.008 
  (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Time under pediatric 
exclusivity regime 
   0.027 0.031 0.031 
   (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) 
Time to expiry of 
exclusivity protections 
    0.013 0.012 
    (0.025) (0.026) 
10% < Annual sales 
percentile < 20%   
0.926 0.903 0.908 0.904 0.895 0.903 
(0.842) (0.842) (0.842) (0.842) (0.843) (0.843) 
20% < Annual sales 
percentile < 30% 
-17.081 -17.105 -17.090 -17.092 -18.213 -18.205 
(3,590) (3,588) (3,588) (3,587) (6,295) (6,296) 
30% < Annual sales 
percentile < 40% 
0.681 0.649 0.650 0.647 0.658 0.669 
(0.871) (0.872) (0.872) (0.872) (0.872) (0.873) 
40% < Annual sales 
percentile<50% 
0.941 0.904 0.902 0.895 0.900 0.913 
(0.842) (0.843) (0.843) (0.844) (0.844) (0.844) 
50% < Annual sales 
percentile < 60% 
1.245 1.204 1.202 1.190 1.181 1.199 
(0.807) (0.809) (0.809) (0.810) (0.810) (0.811) 
60 %< Annual sales 
percentile < 70% 
0.446 0.409 0.407 0.397 0.380 0.410 
(0.918) (0.919) (0.919) (0.920) (0.920) (0.923) 
70% < Annual sales 
percentile < 80% 
1.234 1.192 1.180 1.173 1.157 1.184 
(0.823) (0.824) (0.824) (0.825) (0.825) (0.827) 
80% < Annual sales 
percentile<90% 
2.362** 2.319** 2.321** 2.300** 2.271** 2.297** 
(0.752) (0.754) (0.754) (0.756) (0.758) (0.760) 
Annual sales 
percentile>90% 
3.015** 2.964** 2.969** 2.954** 2.916** 2.942** 
(0.739) (0.742) (0.742) (0.743) (0.746) (0.749) 
Constant 
-24.425 -24.360 -24.435 -5.113** -25.691 -25.677 
(7,089) (7,090) (7,096) (0.860) (13,913) (13,914) 
Observations 3,350 3,348 3,348 3,348 3,348 3,348 
Number of 
Pharmaceuticals 
511 511 511 511 511 511 
All regressions include Year Fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
N.B. Once pediatric exclusivity is obtained, drug exits data used for above 
reressions. 






Table 25: Survival-time piecewise-constant hazard rate regressions (Failure 
=granting of pediatric exclusivity)   




 -0.649 -0.552 -0.722 
 (0.972) (0.961) (0.983) 
Age of Drug 
  -0.045 -0.042 
  (0.030) (0.030) 
Time to expiry of 
exclusivity 
protections 
   0.031 
   (0.025) 
10% < Annual sales 
percentile < 20% 
1.701 1.673 1.637 1.624 
(1.55) (1.096) (1.096) (1.096) 
20% < Annual sales 
percentile < 30% 
-14.183 -14.207 -14.241 -14.233 
(0.01) (1,353) (1,351) (1,355) 
30% < Annual sales 
percentile < 40% 
1.571 1.535 1.504 1.539 
(1.40) (1.119) (1.119) (1.119) 
40% < Annual sales 
percentile<50% 
1.739 1.690 1.665 1.668 
(1.59) (1.097) (1.097) (1.097) 
50% < Annual sales 
percentile < 60% 
1.882 1.831 1.784 1.743 
(1.74) (1.081) (1.082) (1.082) 
60 %< Annual sales 
percentile < 70% 
1.225 1.187 1.145 1.084 
(1.06) (1.156) (1.156) (1.157) 
70% < Annual sales 
percentile < 80% 
1.968 1.922 1.892 1.839 
(1.82) (1.081) (1.081) (1.082) 
80% < Annual sales 
percentile<90% 
3.020** 2.970** 2.873** 2.787** 
(1.028) (1.029) (1.030) (1.032) 
Annual sales 
percentile>90% 
3.542** 3.482** 3.404** 3.288** 
(1.018) (1.019) (1.020) (1.024) 
Observations 5538 5534 5534 5534 
All regressions include year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
 






Table 26 : Survival-time piecewise-constant hazard rate regressions (Failure = 
granting of pediatric exclusivity)   
Survival-time piecewise regressions (failure = granting of pediatric exclusivity) 
 (29.1) (29.2) (29.3) (29.4) 
Fraction of sales to 
minors 
 -0.576 -0.487 -0.638 
 (0.976) (0.965) (0.984) 
Age of Drug 
  -0.045 -0.043 
  (0.030) (0.030) 
Time to expiry of 
exclusivity protections 
   0.030 
   (0.025) 
10% < Annual sales 
percentile < 20% 
1.701 1.675 1.638 1.624 
(1.096) (1.096) (1.096) (1.096) 
20% < Annual sales 
percentile < 30% 
-14.183 -14.203 -14.238 -14.231 
(1,356) (1,355) (1,352) (1,356) 
30% < Annual sales 
percentile < 40% 
1.571 1.538 1.505 1.538 
(1.119) (1.119) (1.119) (1.119) 
40% < Annual sales 
percentile<50% 
1.739 1.694 1.668 1.670 
(1.096) (1.097) (1.097) (1.097) 
50% < Annual sales 
percentile < 60% 
1.882 1.836 1.788 1.747 
(1.081) (1.081) (1.082) (1.082) 
60 %< Annual sales 
percentile < 70% 
1.225 1.189 1.147 1.086 
(1.156) (1.156) (1.156) (1.157) 
70% < Annual sales 
percentile < 80% 
1.968 1.925 1.894 1.842 
(1.081) (1.081) (1.082) (1.082) 
80% < Annual sales 
percentile<90% 
3.020** 2.973** 2.875** 2.790** 
(1.028) (1.029) (1.030) (1.033) 
Annual sales 
percentile>90% 
3.542** 3.487** 3.407** 3.292** 
(1.018) (1.019) (1.020) (1.024) 
Observations 5538 5534 5534 5534 
All regressions include year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  










The pediatric exclusivity rule is intended to provide benefits to pediatric 
patients by providing clinicians with label information regarding safety and 
dosage in pediatric populations. We test whether valuable and important 
information is being produced and disseminated by the clinical trials that are 
undertaken to gain pediatric exclusivity. We do this by examining the patterns of 
publication of clinical trials before and after pediatric exclusivity is obtained and 
by examining the patterns of prescriptions to minor patients before and after 
pediatric exclusivity is obtained.  
We find no evidence of greater dissemination of pediatric information in 
the peer-reviewed literature after obtaining pediatric exclusivity. We also find no 
evidence of changing patterns of prescriptions to minor patients before and after 
pediatric exclusivity is obtained. This leads us to question the value of the 
information being provided and conclude that the intended benefits of pediatric 
exclusivity provision are not being realized. We conclude that pediatric 
exclusivity legislation is an example of regulatory capture, designed primarily to 
increase monopoly protection of the sales of brand-name drugs without 













In the previous chapter, we estimated the cost of the pediatric exclusivity 
questions at over US$ 21 billion in current undiscounted dollars. In this chapter 
we examine whether the intended benefits provided by the legislation are indeed 
being realized.   
 
In the analyses conducted in the prior chapter, we found evidence to 
suggest that the likelihood of pharmaceutical companies conducting pediatric 
exclusivity tests is strongly correlated to the sales of the drugs. Further, we also 
found that the proportion of prescriptions to minors did not appear to be a factor 
in obtaining pediatric exclusivity. 15 These factors affecting selection of drugs 
supports Boots et al.’s (2007) findings that the majority of drugs granted pediatric 
exclusivity are those that treat central nervous system, cardiovascular, 
alimentary and metabolism disorders, which are relatively rarely used by 
children. Boots et al. found that drug categories frequently used by children, 
such as respiratory drugs, anti-infectives for systemic use and dermatologicals 
                                                 
15
 The possible exceptions to this being the ADHD trio of outliers- Adderall, Concerta and 
Strattera (over 50% of prescriptions to minors) which were excluded from our analyses.  
 






are underrepresented in the pediatric trial data.  However, it should be noted 
that in the previous chapter, on average, we found no significant difference 
between the ratios of drugs prescribed to children for drugs with and without 
pediatric exclusivity. Drugs with pediatric exclusivity had higher sales and a 
higher number of prescriptions. Therefore, drugs with overall higher 
prescriptions were prescribed to children at a higher volume (if not a higher 
rate), and the information provided due to tests on pediatric exclusivity is 
therefore applicable to a larger number of prescriptions. This can clearly be 
classified as an intended benefit of the legislation.  Nevertheless, we concluded at 
the end of the last chapter, that pediatric exclusivity appears to show all the 
symptoms of Stigler’s (1971) theory of regulatory capture. It provides large 
transfers (up to a few billions of dollars in sales per drug, and presumably large 
profits) from diffuse consumers to a small number of producers, at the relatively 
small cost of clinical trials (tens of millions of dollars) (Li, Eisenstein et al. 2007).  
 
 This chapter is comprised of four parts. In the first part, we develop our 
theory and hypotheses regarding regulatory capture and the benefits of pediatric 
exclusivity regulations In the second part we describe our data and the methods 
used to test our hypotheses. In the third part we present our findings. Finally, we 






discuss our results and present our conclusions and suggestions for future 
research. 
Theory 
The FDA is one of the most powerful market regulators with sweeping 
powers to deny or permit sales of all drugs in the US, as well as grant extensions 
of market exclusivities (Carpenter 2010) . The FDA must answer,however to 
many audiences including the US Congress which passes legislation changing its 
powers and controls its budget (Kim 2007).  Pediatric exclusivity is one such 
provision created by US Congress in 1997 and renewed in 2002 and 2007. (21 
U.S.C. 365 bb(a)(2)).  
 
The FDA’s role as regulator (and Congress’s as legislator) is theoretically 
one of maximizing social welfare (Pigou 1938; McCraw 1975).  the institutions 
that regulate the market are viewed as Bayesian statisticians, optimizing welfare, 
frequently under incomplete information conditions (Laffont and Tirole 1986). 
 
Political theories of regulation differ from this account, arguing that is in 
the interest of all groups to attempt to influence regulation for their benefit. 
Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action where incentives to organize are higher 
for small groups with high stakes that are spread among fewer actors, was used 






by Stigler (1971) to develop the idea that an industry with few producers would 
be able to influence actors more than widely disbursed consumer groups. 
Peltzman (1976) accounted for the fact that the United States Congress 
occasionally passes laws that hurt large businesses and reduce protectionism by 
developing a model that balanced interest group support and voter group 
support to legislators, who require both money and votes to win re-election. 
Laffont and Tirole (1991) developed an agency-theoretic model of regulatory 
capture and argued that interest groups are more powerful when they seek to 
obtain inefficient regulation, where inefficiency is determined by the degree of 
information asymmetry between the regulated industry and the regulators. 
Evidence for regulatory capture can be found in the legislation that 
Congress produces (and in the enforcement by the FDA) favoring one group 
over another, specifically favoring small financially powerful groups over diffuse 
groups (Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983). In Chapter 2, we identified reasons that 
pediatric exclusivity legislation was an example that showed capture of 
Congressional legislation by the brand-name pharmaceutical industry. First, 
unlike previous attempts to produce data on pediatric safety, it involved no 
requirements or demands upon the industry. Everything could be done at the 
pace of the firm, (other than the fact that some current exclusivity must exist) and 
at the option of the firm, except for labeling after the trials were complete. 






Second, it provided incentives of a 6-month pediatric exclusivity, potentially 
worth billions (a blockbuster drug is an industry term for a drug with over $1bn 
in sales) against clinical trials that required outlays in the tens of millions. (Li, 
Eisenstein et al. 2007).  Third, the transfers were coming from diffuse groups in 
the form of adults (getting no benefits from the trials) and children (who might 
be getting some benefits) who bought the drug and who had a 6-month delay in 
getting a lower-priced one. The calculations of cost-to-consumer are opaque and 
not easily appreciated by the individual.  
  
 While we calculate an undiscounted cost-to-consumer in excess of $21 
billion, in order to decide if it is regulatory capture by the brand-name 
pharmaceutical industry, if the Peltzman (1976) balance that the legislators have 
to accomplish between finance and votes is firmly tilted towards the small 
financially powerful group, we need to ask whether we can quantify any tangible 
benefits that might be weighed against the cost to adult and pediatric consumers. 
In the rest of the section we will hypothesize the benefits implied by the 
legislation and then test our data to see whether these are realised 
 
Reasons for pediatric exclusivity legislation 
 






Pediatric exclusivity was enacted by the US Congress with the stated goal 
of remedying the paucity of data on safety of drugs on children.  Doctors 
wishing to prescribe these drugs for children must prescribe them “off-label”, i.e. 
for a purpose or to a population that has not been specifically approved in 
clinical trials by the FDA.  The FDA has long maintained the general position 
that although physicians may freely prescribe drugs for off-label uses, drug 
manufacturers may not promote such uses. (Mello, Studdert et al. 2009). Clinical 
practice on pediatric populations has often involved “off-label” prescriptions. 
(Conroy, Choonara et al. 2000; McIntyre, Conroy et al. 2000; 't Jong, Eland et al. 
2002; O'Donnell, Stone et al. 2002; Schirm, Tobi et al. 2003).  
 
Prescribing drugs for children is not a simple matter. As children grow, 
their body size and composition, physiology, and cognitive and motor function 
change. The metabolism and toxicity of medications can vary substantially in 
children of different ages (Steinbrook 2002).  This creates a more pressing need 
for reliable clinical trial data. At the same time, there are scientific, ethical and 
commercial challenges to conducting clinical trials on children. First, due to the 
variations in metabolism and toxicity, studies in adolescents (12 to 16 years of 
age) may therefore not provide adequate data for, say, infants (1 month-2 years).  
This creates the requirement for multiple studies across different age groups.  






This increases the cost of the studies making pediatric studies relatively 
expensive compared with the size of the potential market. Further complications 
often cited include the difficulty of finding enough patients to participate, and 
inadequate numbers of quality pediatric pharmacology investigators (Caldwell, 
Murphy et al. 2004).  
 
There are also complex ethical issues associated with studying children. 
Informed consent of children’s parents is not the same as consent of an adult 
(Committee on Bioethics 1995) . As a result federal regulations impose a greater 
oversight role on review boards for pediatric trials versus adult trials.  
(Steinbrook 2002). All these issues add up to fewer pediatric trials, and fewer 
patients in individual pediatric trials, thus giving them less statistical power than 
for adult patients. 
 
 To address this, the FDA has tried various “stick” approaches, 
publishing pediatric rules in 1979, and 1994 requiring dosage information.  
Neither of these rules succeeded in providing much information – in the case of 
the 1994 rule,  because there were so few studies being conducted on children, 
the only statement that  was added to the labeling in most cases was one similar 
to the following: "Safety and  effectiveness in pediatric patients  below the age of  






<weeks/years/months> has not been established." (Cooper 2002). The “carrot-
only” approach has been used by the pediatric exclusivity provision in granting 
an extra 6 months’ market exclusivity in return for specific clinical trials 
conducted by the drug sponsor in consultation with the FDA16. It has had 
somewhat better success at getting companies to do these studies – up until the 




 One of the underlying assumptions of the pediatric exclusivity provision 
is that the information provided by the studies that led to these drugs being 
granted pediatric exclusivity is both new and reliable information. Benjamin, 
Smith et al. (2006) , however, found that, from 1998 to 2004 only 45% of clinical 
trials conducted for pediatric exclusivity were published in peer-reviewed 
journals.  They found that trials with positive labeling requirements were more 
likely to be published, and that publication usually took place within three years 
of submitting the data to the FDA. 
  
                                                 
16 The FDA issues a Written Request for studies, which the firm then responds to and the final 
parameters are mutually agreed upon. 






 Pediatric exclusivity cannot be granted on studies already completed 
before the FDA’s Written Request (FDA Guidance for Industry 1999). We have 
seen that in the interests of disseminating positive information about their 
products, firms are likely to publish at least some of the results of the trials 
conducted for pediatric exclusivity, in peer-reviewed publications, after obtaining 
pediatric exclusivity (Benjamin, Smith et al. 2006). However, given the inherent 
difficulties in conducting pediatric clinical trials described above firms are 
therefore not likely to have done many, if any clinical trials, unless the value of 
the pediatric market alone made it worthwhile for them to do so without the 
effective subsidy of a pediatric exclusivity extension. As we have noted, this lack 
of data was, in fact, the original rationale for the Pediatric Exclusivity provision. 
We would therefore find it likely that firms have not published (or have 
published very few) pediatric trials in peer-reviewed publications before 
submitting data for pediatric exclusivity.  
  
We would therefore hypothesize that: 
 H1: The number of peer-reviewed articles published on pediatric 
trials of a drug is likely to increase after the drug has obtained pediatric 
exclusivity 
  






 Many other factors could increase (or their absence decrease) the 
number of clinical trials such as the drug being used for a variety of therapeutic 
purposes, different forms of taking the drug (pill vs injection), etc. Some of these 
factors would also likely increase (or decrease) the number of clinical trials in 
adults. Therefore it might be appropriate to also test for the ratio of clinical trials 
performed on minors to the number of clinical trials performed on adults.  
Therefore we hypothesize that: 
 H2: The ratio of peer-reviewed articles published on pediatric trials to 
the number of peer-reviewed articles published on adult clinical trials of a 
drug is likely to increase after the drug has obtained pediatric exclusivity 
 
 Peer-reviewed articles are the first step towards dissemination of 
information and are not the only source of information for doctors. The 
dissemination of information is a complex and faulty process and doctors may 
not always be aware of the latest developments(Stross and Harlan 1979). 
Obtaining FDA approval for pediatric uses of a drug would permit companies to 
include such information on promotional material both to doctors and 
consumers. Any negative information would also show up in the labeling 
changes required by the FDA when granting pediatric exclusivity.  
 






 If the information is both high-quality and important to doctors, we 
would expect it to generate impact on prescriptions to minors. Doctors would be 
less likely to prescribe drugs that are ineffective, or have been shown to have 
strong side effects, and more likely to prescribe drugs that have been shown to 
be safe with appropriately tested doses. In either case, therefore, regardless of the 
results of the clinical trials, the information should change the prescribing 
patterns of doctors, and consquently the sales patterns.  
 
Therefore we hypothesize that 
 H3a: The proportion of prescriptions of drugs to minors is likely to 
change after obtaining pediatric exclusivity  
and 
 H3b: The proportion of sales of drugs to minors is likely to change 
after obtaining pediatric exclusivity 
 
Data Description: 
We use data on papers published about clinical trials by searching 
PubMed’s archives for all data on clinical trials for adults and those that focused 
only on minors. We collected clinical trial data on all drugs that obtained 
pediatric exclusivity before Jan 1, 2010. We commence recording clinical trial 






data from 1992, 5 years before pediatric exclusivity was introduced in 1997 via 
Section 111 of the FDAMA. We use data on the number of papers published for 
the period 1992 - 2009.   We also obtain sales and prescription data from the 
household component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey from 1996-2007, 
as described in the previous chapter. We merged this, as before, with new drug 
application data from the FDA Electronic Orangebook.  Pediatric exclusivity data 
was also obtained from the FDA Orangebook and crosschecked with the FDA list 
of drugs granted pediatric exclusivity17. For all our analyses, we drop the three 
outliers identified in the previous chapter- Adderall, Concerta and Strattera.  
 
Variables 
The Federal Drug Modernization Act’s pediatric exclusivity extension, 
1997, and the subsequent renewal in the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act 
2002 were intended to stimulate pediatric research and provide benefits for 
children (Roberts, Rodriguez et al. 2003). These benefits have been questioned by 
various researchers (Benjamin, Smith et al. 2006; Boots, Sukhai et al. 2007). We 
use the following variables to determine if the information provided by the trials 
conducted to obtain pediatric exclusivity and subsequent labeling generate 
                                                 
17
 http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DevelopmentResources/ucm050005.htm 






information that changes patterns of prescriptions and sales of pharmaceuticals 
to minors.  
 
Dependent and Independent variables: 
We conducted a PubMed search to count the number of human clinical 
trials for each drug that was granted pediatric exclusivity before Jan 1, 2010. For 
pediatric data, we use the clinical trial data that focuses on pediatric patients and 
not adults. We did this because the “adult” age classification in pubmed is 19+ 
and minor is 0-18. We found that trials conducted on subjects aged 18 and up 
were frequently classified into the “both minor and adult”category. On a random 
subsample, the appearance of 18 year olds only appeared to be the vast majority 
of the publications that had both minors and adults in the study. From the data 
thus collected we generated, for each year,: 
a. The number of papers published on clinical trials 
b. The number of papers published on clinical trials on minors, and 
c. Fraction of papers published on clinical trials of minors 
 
To address the impact of pediatric exclusivity, we used (in different regressions), 
as dependent and independent variables,  
 






Fraction of annual prescriptions to minor patients 
The total prescriptions to minor patients for each drug for the year divided by 
total prescriptions to all patients for each drug for the year.  
 
Fraction of annual sales to minor patients 
The total sales to minor patients for each drug for the year divided by total 
sales to all patients for each drug for the year.  
 
In order to determine whether the ratio of publications of clinical trials on 
minors to publications of clinical trials on adults increases as a result of the 
granting of pediatric exclusivity, we calculate the difference in the fraction of 
publication of trials on minor patients for each drug generated at the point of 
granting pediatric exclusivity. Using Benjamin et al’s (2006) findings that almost 
all of the publications occurred within three years of the date of submission to 
the FDA as our guideline, we use the difference over a time period up to three 
years. 
 
Difference in fraction of annual publications on clinical trials on minor patients over 
periods before and after time ’t’ 
a. Year over previous year  at time ‘t’ 






The difference between the fraction of annual publications on clinical 
trials on minors for a drug in the current year and the previous year (t-1). 
b. Two year period over prior two year period at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual publications on 
clinical trials on minors for a drug in the current year t and the next year 
t+1 and the mean fraction of annual publications on clinical trials on 
minors for a drug in the previous two years t-1 and t-2 
c. Three year period over  prior three year period at time ‘t’- 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual publications on 
clinical trials on minors for a drug in the current year ‘t’ and the next two 
years t+1 and t+2 and the mean fraction of annual publications on clinical 
trials on minors for a drug in the previous three years t-1 ,t-2, and t-3. 
 
As a robustness check, we also use the difference in fraction of annual 
publications on clinical trials on minor patients between periods before and after and  
not including the current year ‘t’ 
a. Next year versus prior year at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the fraction of annual publications on clinical 
trials on minors for a drug in the next year (t+1) and the previous year (t-
1). 






b. Next two years versus previous two years at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual publications on 
clinical trials on minors for a drug during the next two years t+1 and t+2 
and the mean fraction of annual prescriptions to minors of the drug in the 
previous two years t-1 and t-2 
c. Next three years versus previous three years at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual publications on 
clinical trials on minors for a drug in the current year ‘t’ and the next two 
years t+1 and t+2 and the mean fraction of annual publications on clinical 
trials on minors for a drug in the previous three years t-1 ,t-2, and t-3. 
 
In order to determine whether the rate of prescriptions of the drugs to minors 
change as a result of the granting of pediatric exclusivity, we calculate the 
difference in the fraction of annual prescriptions to minor patients for each drug 
generated at the point of granting pediatric exclusivity. As it is possible that for 
some drugs the rate of prescriptions changes positively and for others negatively, 
we also use the square of the difference in the fraction of annual prescriptions to 
minor patients for each drug at the point of  pediatric exclusivity. 
 






Difference in fraction of annual prescriptions of minor patients over periods before 
and after time ’t’ 
a. Year over previous year  at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the fraction of annual prescriptions to minors for a 
drug in the current year and the previous year (t-1). 
b. Two year period over prior two year period at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual prescriptions to 
minors for a drug in the current year t and the next year t+1 and the mean 
fraction of annual prescriptions to minors of the drug in the previous two 
years t-1 and t-2 
c. Three year period over  prior three year period at time ‘t’- 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual prescriptions to 
minors for a drug in the current year ‘t’ and the next two years t+1 and t+2 
and the mean fraction of annual prescriptions to minors of the drug in the 
previous three years t-1 ,t-2, and t-3. 
 
As a robustness check, we also use the difference in fraction of annual 
prescriptions of minor patients between periods before and after and  not including 
the current year ‘t’ as well as its second moment(square). 
a. Next year versus prior year at time ‘t’ 






The difference between the fraction of annual prescriptions to minors for a 
drug in the next year (t+1) and the previous year (t-1). 
b. Next two years versus previous two years at time ‘ti 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual prescriptions to 
minors for a drugs during the next two years t+1 and t+2 and the mean 
fraction of annual prescriptions to minors of the drug in the previous two 
years t-1 and t-2 
c. Next three years versus previous three years at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual prescriptions to 
minors for a drug in the current year ‘t’ and the next two years t+1 and t+2 
and the mean fraction of annual prescriptions to minors of the drug in the 
previous three years t-1 ,t-2, and t-3. 
 
For hypothesis 2b, we also determine whether the sales of the drugs to minors 
changes as a result of the granting of pediatric exclusivity and we calculate the 
difference in the fraction of annual sales to minor patients for each drug 
generated at the point of granting pediatric exclusivity. As before, we are 
interested in seeing whether there is a change. It is possible that some changes 
are positive and some are negative, and we would see an overall null effect. To 
test for this we also use the square of the difference in the fraction of annual sales 






for minor patients for each drug generated at the point of granting pediatric 
exclusivity. 
 
Difference in fraction of annual sales of minor patients over periods before and after time 
’t’ 
a. Year over previous year  at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the fraction of annual sales to minors for a drug in 
the current year and the previous year (t-1). 
b. Two year period over prior two year period at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual sales to minors for a 
drug in the current year t and the next year t+1 and the mean fraction of 
annual sales to minors of the drug in the previous two years t-1 and t-2 
c. Three year period over  prior three year period at time ‘t’- 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual sales to minors for a 
drug in the current year ‘t’ and the next two years t+1 and t+2 and the 
mean fraction of annual sales to minors of the drug in the previous three 
years t-1 ,t-2, and t-3. 
 






As a robustness check, we also use the difference in fraction of annual sales of 
minor patients between periods before and after and  not including the current year 
‘t’ 
a. Next year versus prior year at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the fraction of annual sales to minors for a drug in the 
next year (t+1) and the previous year (t-1). 
b. Next two years versus previous two years at time ‘ti 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual sales to minors for a 
drugs during the next two years t+1 and t+2 and the mean fraction of annual 
sales to minors of the drug in the previous two years t-1 and t-2 
c. Next three years versus previous three years at time ‘t’ 
The difference between the mean fraction of annual sales to minors for a drug 
in the current year ‘t’ and the next two years t+1 and t+2 and the mean 
fraction of annual sales to minors of the drug in the previous three years t-1 ,t-
2, and t-3. 
 
Control variables 
Age of drug 
The older the drug, the more likely that the drug already has a safe off-
label use among minors and that non-clinical trial information is available to 






doctors. This would tend to reduce the likelihood of new information having 
significant changes in prescription patterns.  
It is also possible that these drugs are nearer the date of expiration of their 
current patent or market exclusivity protections, which would decrease the 
likelihood that pharmaceutical companies would invest in aggressively 
changing their marketing literature, and doctors would have to obtain 
information by way of peer-reviewed journals, if the trials were published or 
labeling changes, if any. Due to these effects, we control for age in our 
analyses. 
We use the number of years since the drug was first approved by the 
FDA. This is left-censored by the Orangebook at 1982, so all drugs first 
approved before January 1, 1982, are assumed to be approved on January 1, 
1982. 
 
Number of years under pediatric exclusivity regime 
As the drug could not have been approved before 1997, this is defined as 
the number of years since 1997 that the drug has been approved by the FDA 
 
Time trends. 






As time has passed since 1997, there has been more time to conduct 
studies and obtain pediatric approval.  We use year fixed effects in all regressions 
to control for this and any other time trends. 
 
Methods: 
We use a series of t-tests to estimate the difference between the fraction of 
publications on pediatric clinical trials in a 1, 2 and 3 year period before and after 
pediatric exclusivity.  
 
We also do t-tests to estimate the difference between the change in 
prescriptions to minors in a 1,2 and 3 year period before and after the point of 
pediatric exclusivity  versus the average changes observed in the 1,2, and 3 year 
periods around all other points. 
It is possible that for some drugs, this change is positive, due to 
information indicating, for example, that the drugs are safe for pediatric use or 
need to be taken for longer period . On the other hand, other drugs may be 
contra-indicated for pediatric use. It is possible that if the first moment average is 
used, we may find an overall null effect. To eliminate this possibility, we also 
estimate the second moment, i.e. the difference in the squares of the change in 
prescriptions to minors in a 1,2 and 3 year period before and after the point of 






pediatric exclusivity  versus the mean squares of changes observed in the 1,2, 
and 3 year periods around all other points. 
 
 
We also conduct a fractional two-stage probit analysis using Papke and 
Wooldridge’s (2008) technique for fractional response variables using panel data 
with endogenous explanatory variables. For example, in one of the two-step 
procedures, we first estimate the reduced form equation for the endogenous 
explanatory variable Xit, where  Xit  is the fraction of pediatric prescriptions of the 
‘i’th drug at time ‘t’. We obtain the residuals for each i,t pair νit. In the second 
step, we use the pooled probit quasi-maximum likelihood estimator to calculate, 
Yjt = β1Xit  + β2zit + β3 νit +εit 
Yit is the ratio of articles published about pediatric trials to the total articles on 
adult trials conducted on the ‘i’th drug at time t.  
 
Results 
 Table 1 describes the key variables in our data, and Table 2 presents the 
correlation matrix. We see that the fraction of prescriptions and the fraction of 
sales to minors are highly correlated. The fraction of sales to minors is also 
slightly correlated with the fraction of articles published on pediatric trials. Table 






3 presents the number of papers published on pediatric and adult clinical trials. 
While we have per-drug data for all the drugs with pediatric exclusivity, we only 
collect aggregate data for the drugs that did not obtain pediatric exclusivity. 
Collecting individual data for these (several thousand) drugs is a project for 
future work. We note that the fraction of articles published on pediatric trials of 
drugs that did obtain pediatric exclusivity is actually lower than for drugs that 
have not obtained pediatric exclusivity, barring in 2008 and 2009. Table 4 
presents data on the number of pediatric trials published before and after 
obtaining pediatric exclusivity. We see that, contrary to our a priori expectations, 
that drugs have indeed had some pediatric trials before being granted pediatric 
exclusivity, in some cases many years before the provision even existed. In 
Specifically, out of the 155 drugs that did obtain pediatric exclusivity before 2010,  
105 drugs had articles on pediatric trials that were published before they had 
obtained pediatric exclusivity, and 43 had more than 10 articles on pediatric 
clinical trials published before obtaining pediatric exclusivity. 
 
 H1 is first tested using t-statistics in table 5. We see that in table 5, only the 
change in fraction of papers published between years  ‘t+1’ and ‘t-1’ is 
statistically significant. This could well be an artifact of the data, and we 
conclude initially that there is no support for H1. Our two-stage regression 






analyses confirm this in Table 11, with none of the regressions showing any 
support for H1. The factor “pediatric exclusivity already granted” is statistically 
insignificant across all regressions, including the fully specified models 11.3 and 
11.6 (Fraction of prescriptions and fractions of sales are kept in separate 
regressions as they are so highly correlated). We conclude that there is no 
support for H1 and that the extra clinical trials being conducted for the pediatric 
exclusivity provision are either not being published in adequate numbers, or, as 
the companies are publishing clinical trials on the same drugs before and after 
obtaining exclusivity, may well likely have conducted for these specific drugs 
anyway.  
 
To test H2a and H2b, we also use t-tests to differentiate whether the 
changes in the fraction of prescriptions to minors (Tables 7 and 9) and sales to 
minors (Tables 8 and 10 ) during the period where pediatric exclusivity was 
obtained were substantially different. We find no support for H2a or H2b. In 
tables  6,7,8,9, and 10 we do not find any consistent support for evidence of any 
change in prescriptions or sales around the time of obtaining pediatric 
exclusivity. In fact using the second moments in table 8 and 10 we find strong 
evidence in the opposite direction, i.e. that changes in the rate of prescriptions 
and sales are much lower around the year of obtaining pediatric exclusivity 






versus similar periods around other years. We do not know why this should be 
so.  
The two-stage regression analyses in Table 12 and 13 do not show any 
effect of obtaining pediatric exclusivity on either the fraction of prescriptions to 
minors (Full regression 12.3) or sales to minors (full regression 13.3). All the 
regressions in Table 11,12,and 13 do support a strong correlation between the 
fraction of articles published on pediatric clinical trials and the fraction of 
prescriptions to minors as well as the fraction of sales to minors. We can interpret 
this correlation as greater information on minors providing a greater likelihood 
of prescriptions, or the demand for prescriptions in minors providing the 
companies with the financial incentive to conduct and publish clinical trials on 
minors. However, this does not appear to be correlated with the pediatric 
exclusivity provision as we don’t find any effect of having obtained pediatric 
exclusivity. To recap, none of our analyses provide support for either H1, H2a or 
H2b, and there is evidence of statistically significant effects in the opposite 
direction predicted by H2a and H2b. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 






We were unable to detect any change in publishing patterns as a result of 
obtaining pediatric exclusivity. We observed lower changes in prescription 
patterns to minors around the period where pediatric exclusivity was obtained. 
This strongly suggests that there is limited, if any, additional information being 
made available to clinical practitioners as a result of pediatric exclusivity. It is 
possible that the prescription patterns are not being affected because 
dissemination of off-label prescription practices (Mello, Studdert et al. 2009) is 
efficiently providing doctors with the necessary information. It is also possible 
that the trials themselves do not have the statistical power to add enough new 
information. Either or both these processes may be occurring, and are not 
distinguishable from our data. Nevertheless, this is disturbing as it cuts at the 
very heart of the rationale for stimulating pediatric testing- that the testing is 
important and provides valuable relevant information.  
 
 The FDA has many audiences. Almost all these audiences would 
prefer pediatric testing.  The perception of the FDA as public safety guardian and 
it’s own desire to increase it’s reputation guides a safety-first mentality and a 
desire to minimize Type 1 errors (Kim 2007). While the costs are borne by a 
fragmented set of consumers and are difficult to calculate, the benefits to the 
consumer too appear to be difficult to aggregate. The benefits for the 






pharmaceutical companies are tangible and clear. The FDA thus faces an 
audience that would perhaps prefer the intangible idea of “safety for children”, a 
pharmaceutical audience looking for tangible rewards, and a relatively diffuse 
(and consequently less likely to be engaged) audience bearing the costs.  
 
The ability to change labels and provide some information allow the FDA 
to address it’s audiences of the general public and the pediatricians.  
 
The FDA’s audience of pharmaceutical companies would prefer to 
continue to be given profitable incentives to conduct trials and to be able to 
negotiate low-cost trials with short time periods and the minimum number of 
participants, reducing the statistical power and the likelihood of information 
being provided.  
 
In their Guidance to Industry, 1999, the FDA has stated that they do not 
currently enforce the provision that allows them to require pediatric testing of a 
drug. Under the pediatric exclusivity provision, the 6-month extension can be 
granted so long as the drug is currently under patent or other market exclusivity. 
As patent exclusivity lasts for 20 years (and other provisions may extend this 
further), this permits the trials to be conducted anytime during this period, and 






consequently, the information can be delayed until the pharmaceutical firm that 
owns the drugs decides that the incentives are sufficient for it to conduct trials. 
 
If the information provided from trials was expected to be essential to 
patient safety, it would be more likely that the FDA  would choose a more even 
balance between the “carrot” of pediatric exclusivity and the potential “stick” of 
requiring pediatric testing. The absence of the “stick” in the FDA’s approach  
therefore lends some weight to the supposition that it is not expected by the FDA 
that very critical information is provided and that only some minor information 
regarding dosing and side effects may be provided by these trials. 
 
 During the passage of the 2002 BPC, the American Association of 
Pediatricians (AAP), a non-profit group dedicated to pediatric healthcare issues, 
stated in its testimony before Congress that “ the AAP does not take lightly to 
adding costs to the health care of individuals, but we strongly believe that a 
parent or grandparent would be agreeable to spending a few dollars for more 
than six months in order to ensure that a drug their child or grandchild was 
taking had the appropriate dosing, safety and effectiveness information”(pg 542, 
(Cooper 2002))   
 






Unfortunately, we don’t find any evidence that valuable information, not 
previously available, is provided by these trials.  Nevertheless the entire 
population, adults included, pays heavily for the 6-month extensions granted 
through costs of delayed generic availability. In other words, those “few dollars” 
mentioned soon add up.  Our very conservative estimate in the prior chapter of 
approximately US$ 21 billion in undiscounted dollars of consumer liability at the 
end of 2007 is not a small amount, even set against the $130 billion in annual 
pharmaceutical expenditure(2007)  
 
 
Our study has many strengths, in terms of the multi-year nature of the 
data, the repeated questioning and sampling of the AHRQ survey and the 
comprehensiveness of the Orange Book information. The study also has its 
limitations. First, it is possible that the reason we cannot detect changes in 
prescription patterns is that they are too subtle to be detected at a macro level. It 
may not be that the information being passed is of relatively small importance, 
rather it may be because the changes required are of a fine order, such as a small 
adjustment in dosage, being watchful for certain side-effects or reducing or 
increasing the time of the regimen.  
 






Much work remains to be done in this area. The effectiveness of 
regulatory stimulation for research in pharmaceuticals can be assessed in many 
ways. One possible area for future study would be to assess the actual tests 
conducted for the pediatric exclusivity provision for power, long-term follow up 
and compare them to similar adult tests. A further project for future research 
would be to study the sales and prescription patterns of the drugs that the FDA 
has issued written requests for, but whose studies were delayed by the 
pharmaceutical firm or have not been conducted at all.   
 
 






Table 1 : Data description 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Articles published on human 
clinical trials in a year 
31.40 44.29 0 281 
Fraction of articles published 
on pediatric trials 
6.26% 10.84% 0 100% 
Fraction of sales to minors (%) 8.34% 19.1% 0 100% 
Fraction of prescriptions to 
minors (%) 
8.48% 19.1% 0 100% 
Age of drug (years) 7.74 6.00 0 25 
Time under pediatric 
exclusivity regime (years) 
4.42 2.97 0 10 
 






























-0.0254 0.3561    
Fraction of 
prescriptions 
to minors (%) 
-0.0142 0.3208 0.9705   
Age of drug 
(years) 





0.1954 0.0219 0.0241 0.0283 0.6180 














Table 3 : Papers published on pediatric and adult clinical trials 
Year 
Obtained Pediatric exclusivity 
before 2010 
Pediatric exclusivity not obtained 
before 2010 
 Pediatric Total Ratio Pediatric Total Ratio 
1992 102 1,880 5.43% 287 3,333 8.61% 
1993 140 2,056 6.81% 345 3,443 10.02% 
1994 166 2,662 6.24% 410 3,753 10.92% 
1995 200 3,234 6.18% 377 3,701 10.19% 
1996 222 3,273 6.78% 342 3,399 10.06% 
1997 302 3,395 8.90% 389 3,518 11.06% 
1998 290 3,789 7.65% 382 3,539 10.79% 
1999 292 4,375 6.67% 386 3,382 11.41% 
2000 332 4,629 7.17% 294 3,110 9.45% 
2001 349 4,678 7.46% 358 3,034 11.80% 
2002 396 4,976 7.96% 308 3,265 9.43% 
2003 396 5,800 6.83% 397 3,511 11.31% 
2004 460 6,485 7.09% 353 3,542 9.97% 
2005 493 6,936 7.11% 410 4,146 9.89% 
2006 493 6,868 7.18% 455 4,365 10.42% 
2007 573 7,278 7.87% 428 4,822 8.88% 
2008 602 7,040 8.55% 343 4,995 6.87% 
2009 556 6,355 8.75% 363 5,472 6.63% 
 






Table 4 : Papers published on pediatric and adult clinical trials of drugs that 
were granted pediatric exclusivity before 2010 
Year 
Before obtaining pediatric 
exclusivity 
After being granted pediatric 
exclusivity 
 Pediatric Total Fraction Pediatric Total Fraction 
1992 102 1,880 3.10% - - - 
1993 140 2,056 3.90% - - - 
1994 166 2,662 4.72% - - - 
1995 200 3,234 4.10% - - - 
1996 222 3,273 5.80% - - - 
1997 302 3,395 6.98% - - - 
1998 253 3,603 5.53% 37 186 13.94% 
1999 235 3,807 4.20% 57 568 10.85% 
2000 204 3,561 6.29% 128 1,068 9.84% 
2001 176 2,970 5.10% 173 1,708 11.56% 
2002 167 2,479 4.19% 229 2,497 10.11% 
2003 118 2,376 3.91% 278 3,424 7.42% 
2004 124 2,228 4.69% 336 4,257 6.85% 
2005 114 2,047 4.22% 379 4,889 7.57% 
2006 128 1,508 5.68% 365 5,360 7.98% 
2007 65 773 6.45% 508 6,505 7.55% 
2008 14 342 4.67% 588 6,698 8.45% 










Table 5: t-statistics comparing fraction of papers published on pediatric trials  
of drugs with and without pediatric exclusivity at time t 








Variable Mean Mean Welch's df t-stat 
Change in fraction of papers 
published on pediatric trials 
between years 
‘t’ and ‘t-1’ 
0.29% 1.41% 174.4 -1.50 
Change in average fraction of 
papers published on pediatric 
trials between two year period 
‘t’ and t+1 vs two-year period ‘t-
1’ and ‘t-2’ 
0.54% 1.01% 157.0 -0.97 
Change in average fraction of 
papers published on pediatric 
trials between three year period 
‘t’ to t+2’ vs three-year period ‘t-
3’ to ‘t-1’ 
0.69% 0.97% 144.1 -0.55 
Change in fraction of papers 
published on pediatric trials 
between years 
‘t+1’ and ‘t-1’ 
0.49% 2.07% 171.1 -2.38* 
Change in average fraction of 
papers published on pediatric 
trials between two year period 
‘t’ and t+1 vs two-year period ‘t-
1’ and ‘t-2’ 
0.83% 1.23% 140.2 -0.65 
Change in average fraction of 
papers published on pediatric 
trials between three year period 
‘t+1’ to t+3’ vs three-year period 
‘t-3’ to ‘t-1’ 
0.80% 1.42% 119.7 -1.02 
Note: The above analyses in this table are restricted to drugs that obtained pediatric 
exclusivity before 2010 






Table 6: t-statistics comparing fractions of prescriptions to minors and 
fractions of sales of minors of drugs with and without pediatric exclusivity  




Fraction of sales 
to minors 
All drugs 





Mean 8.53% 8.41% 





Mean 6.95% 6.78% 
 Welch’s df 2744.5 2708.7 
 t-statistic 2.76* 2.82* 










Mean 9.36% 9.29% 
 Welch’s df 515.6 511.6 
 t-statistic -1.61 -1.66 
     














Mean 9.36% 9.29% 
 Welch’s df 606.6 604.4 
 t-statistic -4.21** -4.29** 







Table 7 : t-statistics comparing changes in prescriptions to minors at time of 
obtaining pediatric exclusivity 
 
 All drugs 




















Variable Mean Mean 
Welch
's df 









‘t’ and ‘t-1’ 







‘t’ and t+1 vs 
two-year period 
‘t-1’ and ‘t-2’ 







‘t’ to t+2’ vs 
three-year 
period ‘t-3’ to ‘t-
1’ 
0.075% 0.97% 50.6 -0.93 0.25% 0.97% 57.63 -0.72 
 
(Table is continued on next page) 
 








Table 7  (cont’d) 
 
 All drugs 






















Variable Mean Mean 
Welch
's df 





Change in fraction 
of prescriptions to 
minors between 
years 
‘t+1’ and ‘t-1’ 
0.21% 0.39% 71.6 -0.19 0.29% 0.39% 88.5 -0.10 




two year period 
‘t+1’ and t+2 vs 
two-year period ‘t-
1’ and ‘t-2’ 
0.11% 1.34% 53.3 -1.22 0.16% 1.34% 61.6 -1.12 




three year period 
‘t+1’ to t+3’ vs 
three-year period 
‘t-3’ to ‘t-1’ 
0.13% 2.5% 43.8 
-
2.01* 
















Table 8: t-statistics comparing changes in sales to minors at time of obtaining 
pediatric exclusivity 
 
 All drugs 

























Variable Mean Mean 
Welch'
s df 




Change in fraction 
of sales to minors 
between years 
‘t’ and ‘t-1’ 
0.005% -1.03% 83.07 1.04 0.11% -1.03% 93.8 1.05 
Change in mean 
fraction of sales to 
minors between 
two year period 
‘t’ and t+1 vs two-
year period ‘t-1’ 
and ‘t-2’ 
0.16% 0.14% 67.9 0.02 0.36% 0.14% 85.9 0.26 
Change in mean 
fraction of sales to 
minors between 
three year period 
‘t’ to t+2’ vs three-
year period ‘t-3’ to 
‘t-1’ 
0.07% 1.24% 50.9 -1.16 0.19% 1.24% 59.1 -1.09 
 
















Table 8 cont’d 
 
 
 All drugs 



























Variable Mean Mean 
Welch'
s df 





fraction of sales 
to minors 
between years 
‘t+1’ and ‘t-1’ 
0.22% 0.31% 67.6 -0.07 0.36% 0.31% 78.8 0.04 
Change in mean 
fraction of sales 
to minors 
between two year 
period 
‘t’ and t+1 vs two-
year period ‘t-1’ 
and ‘t-2’ 
0.14% 1.89% 53.2 -1.59 0.21% 1.89% 61.9 -1.46 
Change in mean 




‘t+1’ to t+3’ vs 
three-year period 
‘t-3’ to ‘t-1’ 
0.11% 2.91% 43.5 -2.11* 0.28% 2.91% 50.5 -1.91 
 
 






Table 9: t-statistics comparing squares of changes in prescriptions to minors at 
time of obtaining pediatric exclusivity 
 
 All drugs 
































Square of the 




‘t’ and ‘t-1’ 
1.81% 0.31% 685.6 7.28** 0.96% 0.31% 536.7 3.11** 
Square of change 
in mean fraction 
of prescriptions 
to minors 
between two year 
period 
‘t’ and t+1 vs two-
year period ‘t-1’ 
and ‘t-2’ 
0.89% 0.23% 144.7 5.29** 0.61% 0.23% 182.1 2.89** 
Square of change 





‘t’ to t+2’ vs three-
year period ‘t-3’ 
to ‘t-1’ 
0.59% 0.41% 50.0 0.63 0.43% 0.41% 52.1 0.05 
 
 
(Table is continued on next page) 
 
 








Table 9  (cont’d) 
 
 All drugs 



























Variable Mean Mean 
Welch'
s df 




Square of change 




‘t+1’ and ‘t-1’ 
1.94% 0.50% 167.1 5.26** 1.27% 0.50% 212.1 2.62* 
Square of change 
in mean fraction 
of prescriptions 
to minors 
between two year 
period 
‘t+1’ and t+2 vs 
two-year period 
‘t-1’ and ‘t-2’ 
0.91% 0.49% 53.9 1.26 0.67% 0.49% 56.4 0.53 
Square of change 





‘t+1’ to t+3’ vs 
three-year period 
‘t-3’ to ‘t-1’ 
0.67% 0.60% 42.5 0.15 0.58% 0.60% 45.9 -0.05 
 
 









Table 10 : t-statistics comparing square of changes in sales to minors at time of 
obtaining pediatric exclusivity. 
 
 All drugs 



























Variable Mean Mean 
Welch'
s df 




Square of change 
in fraction of 
sales to minors 
between years 
‘t’ and ‘t-1’ 
2.02% 0.76% 135.9 3.61** 1.11% 0.76% 137.6 0.96 
Square of change 
in mean fraction 
of sales to minors 
between two year 
period 
‘t’ and t+1 vs two-
year period ‘t-1’ 
and ‘t-2’ 
1.02% 0.30% 109.6 4.38** 0.73% 0.30% 165.7 2.35* 
Square of change 
in mean fraction 
of sales to minors 
between three 
year period 
‘t’ to t+2’ vs three-
year period ‘t-3’ 
to ‘t-1’ 
0.69% 0.45% 50.4 0.72 0.53% 0.46% 56.6 0.21 
 
(This table is continued on next page) 
 












 All drugs 



























Variable Mean Mean 
Welch'
s df 






fraction of sales 
to minors 
between years 
‘t+1’ and ‘t-1’ 
2.15% 0.83% 87.5 2.94* 1.43% 0.83% 100.2 1.29 
Square of 
change in mean 




‘t’ and t+1 vs 
two-year period 
‘t-1’ and ‘t-2’ 
1.04% 0.60% 53.8 1.18 0.81% 0.59% 59.4 0.54 
Square of 
change in mean 




‘t+1’ to t+3’ vs 
three-year 
period ‘t-3’ to ‘t-
1’ 
0.77% 0.76% 42.6 0.04 0.69% 0.76% -0.14 47.4 













Table 11:  Factors affecting the fraction of articles published on clinical trials 
that were on pediatric clinical trials – two stage regression 
 
DV : Fraction of articles on pediatric clinical trials 




2.787** 2.827** 2.820**    
(0.331) (0.352) (0.355)    
Fraction of sales to 
minors 
   2.698** 2.757** 2.754** 




0.099 0.070 0.070 0.105 0.073 0.073 
(0.086) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088) (0.089) (0.091) 
Age of drug  0.014 0.013  0.015 0.015 




  0.002   -0.004 
  (0.038)   (0.038) 
Constant -1.667** -1.606** -1.956** -1.647** -1.604** -1.922** 
(0.104) (0.187) (0.260) (0.104) (0.186) (0.259) 
Observations 992 992 946 992 992 946 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
 
All regressions include year fixed effects  
 










 (12.1) (12.2) (12.3) 
DV: Fraction of prescriptions to minors 
Fraction of articles 
published on pediatric 
clinical trials 
6.264** 6.373** 5.893** 
(0.629) (0.618) (0.530) 
Pediatric exclusivity 
already granted 
0.105 0.135 0.135 
(0.116) (0.110) (0.110) 
Age of drug  -0.010 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.016) 
Time under pediatric 
exclusivity 
  -0.018 
  (0.053) 
Constant -2.081** -2.248** -1.992** 
(0.121) (0.121) (0.365) 
Observations 992 992 946 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year fixed effects 
 
Table 13 : Factors affecting the fraction of sales to minors- two stage regression 
 
  
 (13.1) (13.2) (13.3) 
DV: Fraction of sales to minors 
Fraction of articles 
published on pediatric 
clinical trials 
5.963** 6.088** 5.644** 
(0.644) (0.613) (0.525) 
Pediatric exclusivity 
already granted 
0.134 0.167 0.166 
(0.117) (0.111) (0.112) 
Age of drug  -0.012 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.017) 
Time under pediatric 
exclusivity 
  -0.012 
  (0.053) 
Constant -2.071** -2.210** -2.003** 
(0.145) (0.127) (0.361) 
Observations 992 992 946 
   






Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
In the previous three chapters, we first looked at the various theories of 
regulation. Economic welfare theory posited that the regulator, be it a legislative 
entity like Congress or a bureaucratic entity such as the FDA or the patent office 
existed to maximize social welfare, and acts like a Bayesian statistician, taking 
decisions under uncertainty. (Pigou 1938; McCraw 1975; Laffont and Tirole 1986). 
This theory was criticized for not having much development as to how these rules 
would be made from a political process. Here, regulatory capture theory takes 
over, from Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action where incentives to organize 
are higher for small groups with high stakes that are spread among fewer actors.  
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) argued from this that small groups of 
industries could sway legislative and regulatory bodies, as diffuse groups of 
consumers would find it hard to organize and had lower-powered incentives for 
doing so. While Stigler and Peltzman focused primarily on legislative bodies, 
Laffont and Tirole’s (1991) agency-theoretic model accounted for bureaucratic 
regulators like the USPTO and the FDA, showing that interest groups are more 
powerful when they seek to obtain inefficient regulation, where inefficiency is 
determined by the degree of information asymmetry between the regulated 
industry and the regulators. 






The means by which these groups exercise power are primarily financial 
support to legislators (Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983; Dal Bo and Di Tella 2003) and 
the revolving-door, i.e. hoped-for financial support in the form of future jobs in 
industry for bureaucratic regulators. (Laffont and Tirole 1993; Djankov, La Porta 
et al. 2002).  
The results that regulatory capture theory predicts are socially inefficient 
legislation and socially inefficient bureaucratic rule-enforcing, both in favour of 
small groups with large incentives to be spread over few actors, at the cost of 
diffuse groups. We looked at the latter, first in Chapter 2. The USPTO is a 
bureaucratic organization focused on policing innovation by awarding 20-year 
monopolies. Examiners are tied to quantitative production quotas and neither 
rewarded for quality nor punished for the lack of it.  They are under extreme 
pressure to produce and are looking for any signals in the patent application to 
give them a quick resolution. Regulatory capture theory would predict that we 
would find benefits to top innovators, i.e. the relatively small groups that patent 
a lot. These groups would be salient to examiners, likely to have aggressive legal 
representation, and possibly a case can be made to superiors that they do good 
patents. What we actually found was that patent examiners appeared to grant 
patents to top innovators with less scrutiny in fields which had strong 
intellectual property protections like pharmaceuticals and medicine. The 






converse was true in Computers and Communications, a field where most 
criticisms of bad patents have been made(Merges 1999), and in Electronics, 
where innovators routinely ignore ptents(Lemley 2007). This effect is nearer what 
would be predicted by Carpenter’s (2010) model of reputation, where the 
bureaucratic organization tries to maximize it’s own authority and legitimacy by 
taking actions that maximize it’s legitimacy in the eyes of all it’s audiences. 
Nevertheless regulatory capture theories (Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983) do 
include the regulator balancing the competing pressures of different groups with 
different aims, and it is not possible from our analyses to distinguish this 
balancing act from the framework proposed by Carpenter. 
The story is very different when we come to the legislative body, the US 
Congress in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Here we see that pharmaceutical firms did 
not conduct pediatric trials for years, and all methods to force them, like not 
allowing them to market drugs to pediatric markets, failed. Once a carrot-only 
method granting 6 months’ monopoly rights was adopted, 155 drugs were tested 
in the next 12 years, at an estimated median cost of $12mn. This will result (some 
of it already has) in over $21 billion being transferred from the very diffuse 
group of all consumers of 155 drugs to the far more concentrated group of 
owners of those drugs, in line with Stigler’s (1971) theories. Worse, we were 
unable to find any tangible benefit to pediatric patients in terms of additional 






information in published journals or any evidence of more changes (either 
increase or decrease) in the prescription patterns by doctors. All this is in line 
with what would be predicted by the strong versions Stigler’s (1971) theories of 
regulatory capture, without the influence of consumers in the balancing theories 
of Peltzman(1976) , Becker(1983) or Laffont and Tirole(1986). We conclude that it 
is highly likely that this is a case of regulatory capture, with pediatric exclusivity 
legislation and rules specifically designed to protect brand-name incumbents and 
keep out lower-cost generic competition at a final cost to the consumer, for a 
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